
The episode explores the madman theory in foreign policy, particularly in relation to Trump's tactics and historical precedents.
A president doesn’t have to be irrational to use the madman theory, they just have to look irrational enough to be believed. We dig into how this controversial tactic works in real life: a calculated performance meant to plant a sliver of doubt in an adversary’s mind that you might escalate beyond the “normal” rules of foreign policy and deterrence. With author and scholar James Boyse, we trace the madman theory’s roots in Cold War strategy and negotiation thinking, from Harvard and RAND to the Oval Office. We talk about Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg, and Henry Kissinger, then follow the thread into Richard Nixon’s approach to Vietnam, where credibility, secrecy, and brinkmanship collide. The history is messy, and that’s the point: you can often see the threats, but the outcomes are harder to measure, especially when your opponent refuses to believe you’ll actually do what you imply. From there, we bring the framework into today’s headlines. We unpack Trump foreign policy claims around Ukraine and Russia, the administration’s “purposeful strategic ambiguity,” and how NATO pressure can succeed or sour depending on trust and follow-through. We also confront the limits of madman…
Guest: James D. Boys
Organizations: Harvard, RAND
Places: Vietnam, Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Cuba
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