Brussels Sprouts

On June 22, United Kingdom (UK) prime minister Keir Starmer announced that he would resign as leader of the Labour Party and leave the premiership. Starmer had faced mounting pressure to hand the position over to a new leader after local elections in May that were disastrous for the party, but the decision came after Labour’s Andy Burnham, popular mayor of Greater Manchester, won a special election for a seat in parliament and signaled on June 19 that he would use it to challenge Starmer for leadership of the country.All of this comes after both the UK’s defence minister, John Healey, and armed forces minister, Al Carns, announced on June 11 that they had resigned from their positions. Both former ministers cited funding for the military as the reason for their departures. Healey issued a letter warning that the level of military spending proposed by Starmer “falls well short” of what is needed. Carns stated that the government’s defense investment plan was “neither transformative enough nor sufficiently funded.” The plan, which lays out the funding for military equipment and services, has faced months of delays amid budget disputes within the government. Earlier this month, Chief of the Defence Staff Richard Knighton also said that the UK is running out of time to boost defenses in response to Russian threats, and that risks to the country are greater than at any time since the Cold War.The UK’s struggles highlight two questions that Europe has yet to answer: Can governments generate the political support needed for significantly higher defense spending? And with the United States playing a smaller role, who will provide the leadership needed to organize and drive Europe’s security efforts?To discuss all of this and more, we are excited to welcome back to Brussels Sprouts Shashank Joshi and Tom Wright. Please note that this episode was recorded on Friday, June 19, before Starmer’s official resignation but when it was clear that he would be challenged. Shashank Joshi is the incoming Washington bureau chief at The Economist and was previously the publication’s defense editor. Tom Wright is a senior fellow with the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Brookings Institution.

Over the last several weeks, European allies have been trying to interpret a steady stream of signals from Washington about the future of the U.S. military role in Europe, discussions we've covered on the last two episodes of Brussels Sprouts. Beyond the headlines about troop levels, the broader concern is that the United States may be preparing to scale back some of the critical capabilities that have long formed the backbone of NATO’s deterrence posture, including the forces and enablers needed to rapidly reinforce Europe in a crisis. The uncertainty has exposed deeper questions about how decisions on U.S. force posture are made, how allies should prepare for a potentially smaller American role, and whether Europe is moving fast enough to adapt to a more demanding security environment. These debates are particularly acute in Germany, where questions about deterrence, defense spending, and Europe’s long-term security architecture are increasingly central to the political conversation.To help us dig into these issues and what they all mean for the future of transatlantic security, we’re very happy to welcome Mara Karlin and Liana Fix to this week’s edition of Brussels Sprouts.Liana Fix is a senior fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations.Mara Karlin is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor of practice at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

Today’s Brussels Sprouts discussion follows on from our conversation last week on whether middle powers have the ability to chart a course more independent of the United States. Today, we delve into this question as it pertains to whether Europe can defend itself with significantly less U.S. presence in Europe—or none at all. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently addressed that question, saying that if anyone believes Europe or the European Union can defend itself without the United States, they are "dreaming.” In December, German newspaper Die Welt conducted a wargame simulating a Russian invasion of NATO, in partnership with military researchers at Helmut Schmidt University. During the exercise, Russian troops moved unchallenged through NATO territory for three days, capturing a Lithuanian city in the Suwałki Gap. The resulting analysis has cast serious doubt on whether European NATO states can defend their Baltic allies. We are joined today by one of the wargame participants, Franz-Stefan Gady, as well as Russian military analyst Mike Kofman, to help us delve into these critical questions on how “Europe with less U.S." would fare in a fight against Russia, and how long it might take Europe to get to a place where it can take on greater responsibility for its own defense. Mike Kofman is a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Franz-Stefan Gady is a defense analyst, the founder of Gady Consulting, and an adjunct senior fellow with the Center for a New American Security.

It has been a tumultuous month in the transatlantic alliance. This week, President Donald Trump’s demands to take control of Greenland reached a fever pitch. On Sunday, President Trump threatened major tariffs on Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and a host of other American allies in Europe to coerce them to accept his demands for U.S. control over Greenland. For many European allies, Trump crossed a line, and allies raised the prospect of using their anticoercion instrument against the United States. Though Trump posted on Wednesday afternoon that he had negotiated a “framework deal” to avert the crisis with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, much damage was already done. Meanwhile, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave a speech at the World Economic Forum annual meeting at Davos declaring the end of the era of decisive U.S. global leadership, Trump launched the Board of Peace for Gaza—to which he invited Russian President Vladimir Putin—and Putin ordered more missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s capital and critical infrastructure, in what has been one of the harshest winters in Ukraine in recent memory. Less than a month into the new year, it’s hard to avoid the feeling that we are in the worst period the Transatlantic Alliance has seen since World War II. To help us make sense of recent events and to put this crisis into historical context, we're very happy to welcome Jim Goldgeier and Charles Kupchan to Brussels Sprouts. Jim Goldgeier is a research affiliate at Stanford University and a professor of international relations at American University, and he worked on the National Security Council under the Clinton administration. Charles Kupchan is a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He also served on the National Security Council under Presidents Clinton and Obama.

On January 3, the United States apprehended the sitting president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, and brought him to the United States to face trial for drug trafficking. In the aftermath of the operation, President Trump and other senior officials in his administration have threatened similar aggression against Mexico and Cuba and revived rhetoric about the United States “needing” Greenland. The operation and Washington’s posture have sent shockwaves through the international system, as concerns rise about the resilience of international law and the risk that the world is moving toward a global order based on spheres of influence, where might makes right and authoritarian states like Russia and China sense a freer hand within their respective regions. The Trump administration’s comments about Greenland are putting additional stress on transatlantic relations, with the Danish prime minister making clear that any U.S. attack on Greenland would end the NATO alliance. To help make sense of the geopolitical implications of Maduro’s capture and more, Brussels Sprouts is pleased to welcome back to the podcast Lawrence Freedman and Shashank Joshi.Lawrence Freedman is an emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London.Shashank Joshi is the defense editor at The Economist.

On December 4th, the Trump administration released its long-awaited national security strategy, sending another round of shock waves through the transatlantic community. The national security strategy acknowledges that Europe remains strategically vital to the United States and doubles down on the need for Europe to take more responsibility for its defense, but the strategy is unique in its condemnation of allies, focus on “civilizational erasure”, and promise to intervene to “help Europe correct its current trajectory.” While the 2017 National Security Strategy explicitly laid out several threats Russia poses to American interests, this one makes little mention of Russia except for calls to restore strategic stability. Many of America's European allies are feeling unsettled and concerned about the national security strategy and what it means for transatlantic relations. So, to help us understand the new national security strategy, it differs from Trump's first strategy and where the through lines are, we're excited to welcome Nadia Shadlow and Rebecca Heinrich to Brussels Sprouts. Nadia Schadlow is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and a co-chair of the Hamilton Commission on Securing America’s National Security Innovation Base. Rebeccah Heinrichs is also a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and the director of its Keystone Defense Initiative.

Over the last month, nuclear tensions have been heating up. In late October, Vladimir Putin claimed two achievements: the successful test of a nuclear-powered missile known as Burevestnik and the initial test of an unmanned nuclear-powered submarine known as Poseidon. Both systems theoretically have unlimited range, and both are capable of hosting nuclear warheads. Shortly thereafter, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would resume nuclear testing on an equal basis with Russia and China.This week on Brussels Sprouts, concerns around the world of a revived nuclear arms race are growing. Between Putin’s nuclear testing, inflamed rhetoric from President Trump, and the looming expiration of the New START Arms Control Treaty between Russia and the United States in February 2026, the mounting evidence paints a concerning picture.To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Corey Hinderstein and Jon Wolfsthal to Brussels Sprouts. Corey Hinderstein is vice president of studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is responsible for the Technology, Sustainability, and Nuclear Policy Programs.Jon Wolfsthal is the director of Global Risk at the Federation of American Scientists and a CNAS adjunct senior fellow.