Canada's Court: Oral Arguments from the SCC

The appellant, an Indigenous man with significant cognitive difficulties, repeatedly sexually assaulted a worker at the group home where he resided. He remained in custody pending trial, including a period of detention in a psychiatric facility while temporarily unfit to stand trial. After resiling from three agreements to plead guilty, the appellant did so the fourth time. From charge to conviction, nearly four years elapsed. The sentencing judge imposed a nine-year custodial term. This term was lengthier than the one requested by the appellant, in part because his cognitive difficulties increase the amount of time required for rehabilitative programming. The sentencing judge considered the appellant’s repeated abandonment of agreements to plead guilty to be wrongful conduct and disallowed enhanced pre-sentence custodial credit for part of the appellant’s detention. The sentencing judge also relied on the relatively favourable conditions of detention in the psychiatric facility as a basis to deny enhanced credit. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal in part, due to an error in calculating the number of days the appellant spent in custody, but otherwise dismissed the appeal. Mr. J.W. obtained leave to appeal his sentence to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The central issue in this case is whether or not the appellant committed an assault in 1978, under s. 244 of the Criminal Code as it then was. R.A. had confessed to police that when he was babysitting the complainant, who was 5 years old at the time, he was caught masturbating by her as she stood in the doorway of the bathroom. He asked the complainant if she wanted to lick his penis by telling the complainant it was ice cream and she did so for a mere moment. After this brief encounter, R.A. told police he asked the complainant to leave and to not tell anyone— he then threw up in the toilet realizing what he had done. He was charged with committing an indecent assault on the complainant, contrary to s. 149 of the Criminal Code that was in force at that time. The provincial court judge acquitted the accused on the basis that an assault, under then s. 244 of the Criminal Code, had not been made out because, as required by the section, there had been no direct, intentional application of force to the complainant and no attempt or threat by an act or gesture to apply force to the complainant. The British Columbia Court of Appeal unanimously set aside the acquittal, and found that any contact between a child and an adult that is made in a circumstance of a sexual nature satisfies the requirements for a finding of guilt. The matter was sent back to the provincial court for sentencing. The central issue that remains for the appellant R.A. is whether his admitted contact with the complainant meets the definition of s. 244. At that time, s. 244 read: 244. A person commits an assault when (a) without the consent of another person or with consent, where it is obtained by fraud, he applies force intentionally to the person of the other, directly or indirectly; (b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or gesture, to apply force to the person of the other, if he has or causes the other to believe upon reasonable grounds that he has present ability to effect his purpose; …

At trial where the central issue was whether or not the complainant had consented to sexual activity with the accused, the jury found the accused not guilty of sexual assault. The Crown appealed, citing what they believed to be two errors. First: The Crown argued that the trial judge had been too extreme in restricting what text messages between the accused and the complainant could be used at trial. Second: the Crown argued that the trial judge had improperly allowed the defence to illicit evidence of prior sexual activity of the complainant. The trial judge reasoned that this evidence was relevant to an inconsistency between the complainant’s evidence at trial, and her statement to police. The Crown maintained the evidence did not produce an inconsistency. A majority of the Court of Appeal found that the while the judge perhaps should have not have restricted the use of the text messages to that extent, the restrictions were a reasonable use of the trial judge’s powers to manage the trial, so a new trial was not warranted. The Court of Appeal also found that the evidence of prior sexual activity was properly allowed at trial, and was properly left with the jury to consider it as an inconsistency—despite the restriction by the trial judge that the Crown was not allowed to question the complainant about the inconsistency. The Crown’s appeal was dismissed. The dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown, and would have ordered a new trial.

Au terme d’un procès devant jury présidé par le juge Blanchard de la Cour supérieure, l’appelant, Maxime Chicoine-Joubert, a été déclaré coupable d’un chef de meurtre au deuxième degré et d’un chef de voies de fait armées. En appel, M. Chicoine-Joubert soutenait que le juge avait erré dans ses directives relatives à l’homicide involontaire coupable et dans sa réponse aux questions du jury, en omettant de mentionner la mens rea nécessaire. La Cour d’appel du Québec, pour les motifs du juge Vauclair, auxquels a souscrit le juge Hamilton, a rejeté l’appel de M. Chicoine-Joubert. Elle a conclu que les directives au jury étaient correctes dans le contexte de l’affaire. Comme M. Chicoine-Joubert concédait sa culpabilité au verdict d’homicide involontaire, la question du jury sur cette infraction n’exigeait pas que le juge l’aborde. Le juge Bachand, dissident, aurait accueilli l’appel et ordonné la tenue d’un nouveau procès aux motifs que le juge du procès n’avait pas répondu adéquatement aux questions du jury et qu’il existait une possibilité raisonnable que les jurés se soient mépris sur la mens rea requise en matière de meurtre au deuxième degré. Le juge dissident est en accord avec la majorité pour conclure que les directives initiales n’étaient entachées d’aucune erreur justifiant l’intervention de la cour, mais il a conclu que le juge du procès ne s’était pas acquitté de son obligation de répondre de manière claire, correcte et complète aux questions des jurés. Jamais il n’a instruit les jurés sur l’homicide involontaire coupable et ne leur a donné aucun exemple.

En 2015, l’appelant est accusé du meurtre au deuxième degré de sa conjointe. Avant son procès, une juge de la Cour supérieure du Québec accueille sa requête pour que son procès se déroule devant juge seul, suivant le par. 473(1) du Code criminel, en dépit de l’absence de consentement de l’intimé poursuivant. La juge est d’avis que la décision du poursuivant de consentir à un procès devant juge seul n’est pas au cœur de son pouvoir discrétionnaire, mais qu’il s’agit plutôt d’une décision stratégique, soumise au pouvoir de la cour de contrôler sa procédure. En tenant compte des particularités du cas d’espèce, la juge est d’avis que l’accusé s’est déchargé de son fardeau de démontrer que la décision du poursuivant est déraisonnable ou inéquitable dans les circonstances. Au terme d’un procès sans jury, l’accusé est acquitté de meurtre au deuxième degré, mais déclaré coupable d’homicide involontaire coupable. La Cour d’appel accueille l’appel de l’intimé poursuivant et ordonne la tenue d’un nouveau procès sur l’accusation de meurtre au deuxième degré devant un jury. La cour est d’avis que la juge de première instance a erré en appliquant la norme de la décision déraisonnable afin de réviser le refus de consentement du poursuivant alors que l’accusé avait à prouver que ce refus constituait un abus de procédure. La cour conclut que l’accusé échoue à faire cette démonstration et que le jugement contesté est donc vicié par une erreur de droit qui a eu pour effet d’accorder au tribunal une compétence qu’il n’avait pas. Le procès de l’accusé est donc nul.

Hello, my name is Monica Bharadwaj and I am a criminal defence lawyer practicing in downtown Toronto. This is the case of R. v. Jennifer Pan and all. In this infamous case, Jennifer Pan is alleged to have masterminded a plan for her parents to be killed, employing the assistance of her ex-boyfriend and his cohorts to carry out the attack. In her initial police statements, she described a home invasion by assailants whom she did not know. After a lengthy investigation and further statements by Ms. Pan, she was ultimately charged for her role. At trial, Ms. Pan and her co-accused were convicted by a jury of the first-degree murder of her mother, and the attempted murder of her father who survived the attack and who testified at trial. Ms. Pan and her co-accused appealed their convictions. The Court of Appeal remitted the first-degree murder count back for a new trial for all co-accused, citing that the failure to provide the jury with the option to convict on second degree murder or manslaughter, for the death of Ms. Pan’s mother, was an error that deserved a new trial. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for the attempted murder of her father. The Crown appealed to Supreme Court, arguing that the conviction for the 1st degree murder of Ms. Pan’s mother should also stand. Ms. Pan has cross-appealed, asking the Supreme Court to consider this legal conundrum: by sending one count back to trial and upholding another, what happens if the appellate court, on its own decision, creates the possibility of an inconsistent verdict? The Crown argues that it is implausible that Ms. Pan could have the specific intent to kill her father, as required for a conviction of Attempted Murder, whilst not having the specific intent to kill her mother, because, as the Crown argues, both her parents were equal targets of the attack. Countering this argument, the defence points out that The Court of Appeal was unanimous in its decision to remit the 1st degree murder charge back to the lower court for a new trial and made its decision on sound law. However, in recognizing the inconsistency in upholding the attempted murder conviction, in its cross-appeal the defence has asked the Supreme Court to intervene and to create a new test to prevent inconsistent verdicts provoked by appellate decisions under s. 686(1)(a) of The Criminal Code, ultimately arguing for a new trial on all counts.

When an inmate in a provincial correctional facility in Saskatchewan is charged with a disciplinary offence, the governing legislation requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the offence occurred in order to establish guilt. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan asserts that employing this standard of proof violates s. 7 of the Charter. It submits that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal disagreed. The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal to determine whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings. The Crown appealed, and the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence of threats and violence towards the complainant was “past discreditable conduct.” However, the Court of Appeal held that the error could not have impacted the trial judge’s findings because a finding of exploitation or attempted exploitation rested on the evidence of the complainant, which was ultimately not accepted at trial. The appeal was dismissed. When an inmate in a provincial correctional facility in Saskatchewan is charged with a disciplinary offence, the governing legislation requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the offence occurred in order to establish guilt. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan asserts that employing this standard of proof violates s. 7 of the Charter. It submits that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal disagreed. The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal to determine whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings.

Mr. Campbell was convicted of trafficking, and heroine and Fentanyl, and possessing those drugs for the purpose of trafficking them, contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. At trial, Mr. Campbell argued that his rights under Section 8 of The Charter had been violated because he had privacy interests in text messages that he was sending a local dealer. When police arrested that local dealer, incoming text messages were visible on the lock screen that suggested the sender was selling a quantity of drugs to the local dealer. Police impersonated the local dealer and responded to the messages, directing the sender where to attend. Mr. Campbell arrived in accordance with the police instructions for the fictious transaction. He was arrested and 14.33 grams of heroine mixed with fentanyl was found after a search incident to arrest. The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, citing that Mr. Campbell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, and that there were exigent circumstances present for police to act because the texts clearly indicated Fentanyl was to be trafficked. The Court of Appeal agreed that the trafficking of Fentanyl is of such grave public concern that it constituted exigent circumstances, but found that Mr. Campbell did in fact have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the lock screen texts. However, given the police had exigent circumstances, there was no finding that his Section 8 rights were breached and accordingly, his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

This is a bonus episode that features oral argument for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The applicants, Mr. Flemmings and Mr. Agpoon, received a stay of proceedings at trial under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter because of unreasonable delay in bringing them to trial. The heart of the issue was the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on delay. The Crown preferred a direct indictment to mitigate delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the applicants successfully argued at trial that the direct indictment was brought unreasonably late. The Court of Appeal overturned the stay and ordered a new trial. That case was called Agpoon. An accused person is entitled to an oral hearing to argue leave to appeal to the Supreme Court when, as here, a court of appeal overturns an acquittal or stay on an indictable charge and orders a new trial. The applicants sought leave to the Supreme Court, submitting that this case was the Court’s first and best chance determine how COVID-19 delay should be treated under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Agénor Archambault, et al, contre sa Majesté le Roi. En juin et juillet 2019, dans deux dossiers distincts : M. Archambault est accusé de commettre un attentat à la pudeur d’une personne de sexe masculin, survenu entre 1958 et 1960, et M. Grenier est accusé de commettre les infractions de contacts sexuels et agression sexuelle, entre 2003 et 2007. À partir de 2019, ces infractions sont passibles d’un emprisonnement maximal de 14 ans. Cependant, ces infractions étaient passibles d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans au moment où ils auraient été commis. Le 19 septembre 2019, l’art. 535 du Code criminel est modifié, et le droit à l’enquête préliminaire est aboli lorsqu’un prévenu est inculpé d’un acte criminel passible d’une peine d’emprisonnement de moins de 14 ans. Les deux intimés présentent une demande d’enquête préliminaire après le 19 septembre 2019. Les deux demandes sont rejetées par la Cour du Québec pour absence de compétence après la modification à l’art. 535 du Code criminel. Les deux intimés ont fait appel devant la Cour supérieure du Québec, qui refuse le contrôle judiciaire dans chacun des deux cas. La Cour d’appel du Québec détermine que la modification à l’art. 535 du Code criminel s’applique prospectivement et elle renvoie chacun des dossiers à la Cour du Québec pour une enquête préliminaire.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Landry contre sa Majesté le Roi L’appelant, un policier, était en arrêt de travail temporaire en raison de troubles médicaux. Lors d’une réunion avec un médecin-arbitre qui devait déterminer si l’incapacité de l’appelant était permanente, celui-ci a dénaturé ses activités de travail auprès des agences de voyage de son ex-épouse. Le médecin-arbitre a conclu à l’incapacité permanente de l’appelant, qui avait en conséquence droit à une indemnité permanente d’invalidité de son employeur. L’employeur avait connaissance de certaines des activités de travail de l’appelant, mais il n’en a pas informé le médecin-arbitre. Le juge du procès a conclu que tous les éléments de l’infraction de fraude dépassant 5 000 $ étaient établis. L’appelant a été reconnu coupable d’un chef d’accusation de fraude. La Cour d’appel a confirmé à la majorité la décision du premier juge. La juge Cotnam de la Cour d’appel a exprimé sa dissidence et aurait substitué un verdict de tentative de fraude. La dissidence de la juge Cotnam a accordé à M. Landry le droit de faire appel de la décision devant la Cour suprême du Canada.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Tayo Tompouba contre sa Majesté le Roi Monsieur Tayo Tompouba est inculpé d’agression sexuelle. Lors de sa première comparution, il n’est pas avisé de son droit de faire une demande de subir son procès en français, malgré l’obligation de la cour de l’en informer selon le par. 530(3) du Code criminel. Il est reconnu coupable après un procès en anglais. La Cour d’appel reconnait l’erreur de ne pas avoir avisé M. Tayo Tompouba de son droit, mais elle applique la disposition réparatrice afin de rejeter son appel. La Cour d’appel statue que le droit prévu au par. 530(3) s’agit d’un droit procédural et non d’un droit substantiel.