
Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving
by Gareth Lock at The Human Diver
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From 23 epsHost
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Recent episodes
SH290: What Happens Underwater, Stays Underwater — And That's a Problem. Part 1 of 3
Jun 24, 2026
Unknown duration
SH289: Chac Mool - Diving Deeper into a Triple Fatality with Human Factors
Jun 20, 2026
Unknown duration
SH288: The 'Obvious Thing' Nobody Noticed
Jun 17, 2026
Unknown duration
SH287: When the Picture Goes Dark
Jun 13, 2026
Unknown duration
SH286: The Shortcut That Gets You Home — and the One That Doesn't
Jun 10, 2026
10m 22s
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| Date | Episode | Topics | Guests | Brands | Places | Keywords | Sponsor | Length | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6/24/26 | ![]() SH290: What Happens Underwater, Stays Underwater — And That's a Problem. Part 1 of 3 | This episode introduces the problem behind learning in diving safety, using the 2020 death of Linnea Mills to highlight how incidents are often caused by deeper system issues, not just individual mistakes. While near-misses and accidents happen regularly in diving, most are never shared or analysed, meaning valuable lessons are lost. Unlike industries such as aviation or healthcare, diving lacks strong reporting systems, regulation, and reliable data, so decisions are often based on uncertainty rather than evidence. Existing reports tend to focus on immediate causes like equipment failure or diver error, but miss the wider social, organisational, and environmental factors that shape outcomes. The episode argues that meaningful learning comes from “context-rich” stories that explain not just what happened, but why it made sense at the time. Drawing on safety research from other industries, it highlights the need for a stronger reporting culture, psychological safety, and system-level thinking to improve learning and prevent future incidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-1-the-problem-spaceReferences: Dekker, S. (2017). Just culture: Restoring trust and accountability in your organization (3rd ed.). CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.Drupsteen, L., & Guldenmund, F. (2014). What is learning: A review of the safety literature to define learning from incidents, accidents and disasters. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 22(2), 81–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12039EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission.Gigerenzer, G. (2014). Risk savvy. Viking. https://www.amazon.co.uk/Risk-Savvy-Make-Good-Decisions/dp/1846144744Lock, G. (2011). The application of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to improve diving safety. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Iz3qRRyo2NjdiBGbPcRhj14NoCTuuM4/view?usp=share_linkMills v Gull Dive Center PADI (2022). https://www.scribd.com/document/555406095/Mills-v-Gull-Dive-Center-PADI-2nd-Amended-ComplaintOrlady, H. W., & Orlady, L. M. (2017). Human factors in multi-crew flight operations (1st ed.). Routledge.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543543Snowden, D. (2002). Complex acts of knowing: Paradox and descriptive self-awareness. Journal of Knowledge Management, 6(2), 100–111. https://doi.org/10.1108/13673270210424639Waring, J. J. (2005). Beyond blame: Cultural barriers to medical incident reporting. Social Science & Medicine, 60(9), 1927–1935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.08.055Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture | — | ||||||
| 6/20/26 | ![]() SH289: Chac Mool - Diving Deeper into a Triple Fatality with Human Factors | This episode examines a 2012 triple fatality at Cenote Chac Mool in Mexico using a Human Factors approach, showing how accidents are rarely caused by a single mistake but by a combination of small, interacting factors. A guide took two recreational divers beyond safe limits into an overhead cave environment without a continuous guideline, and all three ran out of gas and died. Instead of simply blaming the guide, the analysis explores how things made sense at the time, including authority gradients that stopped the divers from questioning decisions, fatigue from multiple dives, pressure to show something impressive, and increasing task load in a complex environment. Using the PETTEOT framework, the case highlights how people, environment, equipment, organisational culture, and time pressures combined to reduce safety margins until there was no capacity left to recover. The key lesson is that safety depends on understanding these system interactions, building psychological safety so people can speak up, and reinforcing clear rules and preparation to prevent small, “normal” deviations from turning into fatal outcomes.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/chac-mool-triple-diving-fatalityLinks: Full CREER manual: https://creer-mx.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Manual-for-Cenote-Dive-Guides-vs010324.pdfThe Thumb rule: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-diving-instructors-psychological-safety-and-the-thumb-ruleLearning from Emergent Outcomes course waiting list: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture | — | ||||||
| 6/17/26 | ![]() SH288: The 'Obvious Thing' Nobody Noticed | This episode explores the fatal case of 18-year-old Linnea Mills to show how visible hazards can go unnoticed when an instructor lacks the mental capacity to recognise them. Linnea was overweighted, unable to inflate her drysuit, and using equipment that couldn’t provide enough lift—risks that seem obvious in hindsight but were missed due to a combination of inexperience, time pressure, unfamiliar gear, and commercial expectations. Using models like ECOM and COCOM, the episode explains how an instructor’s attention can be consumed by immediate tasks, leaving no capacity to monitor the bigger picture or reassess whether a dive should proceed. This isn’t about blaming an individual, but understanding how systems, workload, and limited experience can overwhelm decision-making. The key lesson is that effective instructors don’t just rely on skill, but on preparation—setting clear plans, checks, and limits before the dive—to protect their ability to recognise problems when it matters most.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-obvious-thing-nobody-noticedLinks: Part 1: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-picture-went-darkThe Linnea Mills case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology | — | ||||||
| 6/13/26 | ![]() SH287: When the Picture Goes Dark | This episode explores why divers don’t truly “lose” situation awareness, but instead run out of the mental capacity needed to maintain it. Through the story of James on a challenging wreck dive, it shows how increasing demands—like current, task focus, and effort—can quietly narrow attention until the bigger picture is lost, even when skills and training are sound. Using two human factors models, COCOM and ECOM, the discussion explains how control shifts from broad, strategic thinking to narrow, reactive behavior as workload rises, and how different layers of awareness—from basic task execution to overall planning—can break down under pressure. It highlights that mistakes are often not about poor decisions, but about limited cognitive resources in the moment. The episode also emphasizes the importance of good preparation, clear decision thresholds, teamwork, and deliberate pauses to manage workload, while showing how reflection after the dive helps improve future performance. Ultimately, it reframes the difference between novice and experienced divers as the ability to manage attention and maintain the bigger picture, not just technical skill.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-picture-went-darkLinks: A 2026 study in Safety Science by Woltjer and colleagues: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753526000822Part two: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-obvious-thing-nobody-noticedTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology | — | ||||||
| 6/10/26 | ![]() SH286: The Shortcut That Gets You Home — and the One That Doesn't✨ | decision-makingheuristics+3 | — | The Human DiverGigerenzer’s push for people to be “risk savvy”+2 | — | heuristicscognitive biases+3 | — | 10m 22s | |
| 6/6/26 | ![]() SH285: When Skill Alone Isn't Enough: The Resilient Performance Model✨ | Resilient Performance Modeldiving safety+4 | — | The Human Diver | — | diving operationsperformance+6 | — | 11m 45s | |
| 6/3/26 | ![]() SH284: LEODSI and PETTEOT: A Systems Approach for Understanding How Diving Really Works✨ | divinghuman factors+3 | — | The Human DiverLEODSI+2 | — | divingLEODSI+5 | — | 12m 10s | |
| 5/30/26 | ![]() SH283: You're Accountable. You're Responsible. You're It!✨ | accountabilityresponsibility+4 | — | — | — | divingaccountability+5 | — | 17m 40s | |
| 5/27/26 | ![]() SH282: Isolation Amplifies Drift: When Remote Operations Make Small Deviations Invisible✨ | remote operationsnormalization of deviation+3 | — | The Human Diverremoteassetgovernance.com | — | isolationdrift+5 | — | 11m 25s | |
| 5/23/26 | ![]() SH281: HMS Scylla Wreck Penetration Tragedy: Two Perspectives on Learning✨ | wreck divinghuman factors+4 | Adam | HMS Scylla | Texas | HMS Scyllawreck diving tragedy+6 | — | 37m 10s | |
| 5/20/26 | ![]() SH280: This Could Happen to Any Dive Operator: What We Can Really Learn From The Perth Diving Academy Incident✨ | dive safetyhuman factors+3 | — | Perth Diving AcademyAustralian Maritime Safety Authority | Rottnest Island | dive operatorsafety systems+3 | — | 9m 44s | |
| 5/16/26 | ![]() SH279: The Tower Was Already Full of Holes✨ | diving incidentshuman factors+3 | — | — | — | divingaccidents+5 | — | 9m 05s | |
| 5/13/26 | ![]() SH278: Be Curious, Not Judgemental✨ | judgementlearning+4 | — | The Human Diver | — | divinghuman factors+5 | — | 6m 53s | |
| 5/9/26 | ![]() SH277: You are entering water with known problems, and don't kid yourself that it's any different.✨ | diving safetyrisk management+4 | — | — | — | divingsafety+5 | — | 11m 55s | |
| 5/6/26 | ![]() SH276: If there are no silver bullets, build capacity to fail safely✨ | safety improvementdiving+5 | — | — | — | safetydiving+6 | — | 14m 57s | |
| 5/2/26 | ![]() SH275: The death of a child in diver training. There are no ‘silver bullet’ solutions✨ | diver trainingsafety systems+3 | — | The Human Diver | — | scuba trainingsafety margin+3 | — | 30m 45s | |
| 4/29/26 | ![]() SH274: When Do We Stop Asking “Why?”✨ | diving accidentsinvestigation methods+3 | — | Accident investigation: Keep asking “why?”Managing the risks of organizational accidents+1 | — | diving safetyaccident investigation+3 | — | 14m 19s | |
| 4/25/26 | ![]() SH273: What story gets told? What words are used? Who gets to the tell the multiple stories?✨ | storytellingsafety+4 | — | What story gets told? What words are used? Who gets to the tell the multiple stories? | Texas | scuba divingsafety+4 | — | 9m 44s | |
| 4/22/26 | ![]() SH272: Seeing what is ‘unseen’: applying human factors to citizen science✨ | human factorscitizen science+4 | — | The Human Diver | — | divingunderwater heritage+4 | — | 9m 16s | |
| 4/18/26 | ![]() SH271: When the Story Hurts Too Much to Change✨ | diving accidentspsychology+3 | — | The Human Diver | — | divingaccidents+5 | — | 10m 02s | |
| 4/15/26 | ![]() SH270: Safe diving starts from the system. Not from the human.✨ | safety culturehuman factors+4 | — | The Human Diver | — | diving safetyaccidents+5 | — | 16m 21s | |
| 4/11/26 | ![]() SH269: What Is the Purpose of an Investigation in Diving?✨ | diving safetyinvestigation purpose+4 | — | The Human DiverIf Only…+3 | — | diving accidentshuman error+5 | — | 11m 04s | |
| 4/8/26 | ![]() SH268: The Hidden Cost of "Never Show Weakness": Why Hiding Instructor Errors Undermines Dive Safety✨ | dive safetypsychological safety+3 | — | The Human Diver | — | dive trainingmistakes+3 | — | 9m 44s | |
| 4/4/26 | ![]() SH267: “Diver's depression” It's time to tackle stigma and taboos✨ | mental healthdiving+5 | — | The Human DiverSt Leger Dowse, M. et al.+1 | — | diver's depressionmental health+5 | — | 9m 46s | |
| 4/1/26 | ![]() SH266: A Review of 2025. Looking Forward to 2026.✨ | Human Factors in DivingLearning and Reflection+3 | — | The Human DiverHFiD: Essentials+4 | 20252026 | Human FactorsDiving+5 | — | 12m 18s | |
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