Oral Arguments from the U.S. Court of Appeals

In the case of Dickerson v. BPP PCV Owners LLC (Docket No. 24-3147), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation was initiated by Gloria D. Dickerson, a pro se plaintiff and resident of Peter Cooper Village (PCV) in Manhattan, against the property owner, BPP PCV Owners LLC (a joint venture involving Blackstone and Ivanhoé Cambridge).The core of the factual dispute involves allegations of housing discrimination, harassment, and retaliation related to the plaintiff's tenancy. Dickerson, a long-term resident, alleged that the management company engaged in discriminatory practices that affected her right to quiet enjoyment and equal access to housing services.A significant portion of the lower court record focused on procedural hurdles; the defendant moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and was "vague and conclusory" regarding specific civil rights violations.In early 2024, the district court granted the motion to dismiss but gave the plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. A factual "comedy of errors" ensued when the pro se plaintiff attempted to file the new complaint at the wrong physical address in Manhattan (80 Worth Street), leading the court to provide additional time and guidance on proper filing procedures.The case was eventually dismissed with prejudice by the District Court for the Southern District of New York after it found that the plaintiff’s subsequent filings still failed to satisfy the federal pleading standards, particularly the "Five Ws" (who, what, where, when, and why) required to establish a plausible claim of discrimination.The current appeal, docketed as 24-3147, challenges that final dismissal. The plaintiff argues that the trial court applied an overly stringent standard to her pro se filings and ignored the substantive evidence of harassment she provided.During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff further opportunities to amend her complaint and whether the existing record contained sufficient factual "nuggets" to warrant a trial on the merits.The defense maintained that BPP PCV Owners LLC acted within its rights as a landlord and that the plaintiff's grievances did not rise to the level of federal civil rights violations or actionable breaches of the lease agreement.

Case Summary: Gemini saidIn the case of Damri v. LivePerson, Inc. (Docket No. 25-964), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe litigation is a federal securities class action brought on behalf of investors who purchased shares of LivePerson, Inc., a conversational AI company, between May 2022 and early 2024.The core factual dispute involves the company’s February 2022 acquisition of WildHealth, a precision medicine startup, for approximately $150 million.Plaintiffs allege that LivePerson and its executives made false and misleading statements regarding the financial health and growth prospects of WildHealth while simultaneously implementing significant capital cuts and layoffs that hindered the subsidiary's ability to generate revenue.A central factual element of the complaint is the disclosure in early 2023 that Medicare reimbursements for a discontinued WildHealth COVID-19 testing program had been suspended, an event plaintiffs claim was known but withheld from investors to artificially inflate the stock price.The factual record highlights a massive decline in LivePerson's market value, with the share price falling over 57% on March 16, 2023, following the company's admission of "material weaknesses" in its internal controls over financial reporting.In March 2025, the district court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs failed to provide specific facts demonstrating "scienter"—the intent to deceive—or that the executives’ upbeat statements about WildHealth lacked a reasonable basis at the time they were made.The appeal, docketed as 25-964, challenges this dismissal, with the appellant arguing that the trial court ignored testimony from confidential witnesses who alleged that the company’s internal metrics directly contradicted its public "business as usual" narrative.During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the company had a duty to disclose the Medicare suspension earlier and whether the executives' stock sales during the class period provided a sufficient motive for the alleged fraud.The court also scrutinized whether the "material weakness" in internal controls, once admitted, provided retroactive evidence that the company's previous financial statements were factually unreliable.

Case Summary:In the case of David McDonald v. Trustees of Indiana University (Docket No. 25-2366), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 19, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation is a constitutional challenge brought by several tenured faculty members, including lead plaintiff David McDonald, an associate professor at Indiana University Bloomington, against the Trustees of Indiana University and Purdue University.The core factual dispute centers on the enforcement of Indiana Senate Enrolled Act 202 (SEA 202), a state law effective July 1, 2024, which mandates that public universities implement policies to promote "intellectual diversity" and "free inquiry" among faculty.The statute specifically requires that faculty members be denied tenure or promotion if they are deemed "unlikely to foster a culture of free inquiry" or "unlikely to expose students to scholarly works from a variety of political or ideological frameworks."The factual record includes a new "post-tenure review" process established by the Act, requiring tenured professors to undergo formal re-evaluation every five years to ensure they are meeting these new ideological diversity standards.Plaintiffs allege that the law is unconstitutionally vague and creates a "chilling effect" on academic freedom, as the statute does not define key terms like "intellectual diversity," leaving faculty unable to discern what pedagogical choices might lead to disciplinary action, including termination.In July 2025, the district court dismissed the lawsuit on procedural grounds, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not yet suffered a concrete injury, such as a formal reprimand or denial of promotion, under the new law.The appeal, docketed as 25-2366, challenges that dismissal, with the plaintiffs arguing that the "chilling" of their classroom speech and the immediate requirement to alter their curricula to comply with the law constitute an "injury-in-fact" sufficient for federal court jurisdiction.The factual background is further complicated by the lead plaintiff’s personal history; David McDonald was previously arrested and temporarily banned from campus during 2024 protests, an event he cites as evidence of the university administration's willingness to use punitive measures against faculty for expressive activity.During the oral arguments on February 19, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel focused on whether the plaintiffs' fear of future discipline is "objectively reasonable" and whether the state’s interest in regulating the curriculum of public employees overrides the First Amendment rights of university professors.

Case Summary:In the case of Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard, OH (Docket No. 25-3265), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on February 18, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation centers on a First Amendment challenge by Norton Outdoor Advertising, which has operated billboards in the Village of St. Bernard for decades.The dispute was triggered when the Village revoked a permit for two billboards located at 130 West Ross Avenue after Norton converted them from static displays to variable-message LED signs.The Village justified the revocation by citing a specific section of its municipal code that prohibits "multiple-message or variable-message" displays for off-premises advertising signs.Norton filed a federal lawsuit alleging that the Village's sign ordinance was unconstitutional because it treated "on-premises" signs more favorably than "off-premises" signs and contained content-based exemptions.In a prior phase of the case, the Sixth Circuit determined that while on/off-premises distinctions are generally content-neutral, the Village’s ordinance included a "public service" exemption that required officials to examine the content of a sign to determine its legality.The appellate court previously ruled that this specific exemption rendered the ordinance content-based, thus triggering strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review for speech restrictions.The current appeal, docketed as 25-3265, follows a remand to the district court to determine whether the unconstitutional "public service" exemption can be severed from the rest of the sign code.The factual record involves a debate over legislative intent: the Village argues the code should remain enforceable without the exemption, while Norton contends the entire regulatory scheme is so intertwined with content-based distinctions that it must be struck down in its entirety.During the oral arguments on February 18, 2026, the Sixth Circuit panel examined whether severing the exemption would fundamentally alter the Village's original goal of balancing traffic safety and aesthetics with free speech rights.The court also scrutinized whether the remaining ban on digital billboards can stand independently if the underlying definitions used to categorize those signs are found to be constitutionally flawed.

Case Summary:In the case of Reginald Chapman v. Eileen O'Neill Burke (Docket No. 25-1311), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 18, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation is a civil rights action brought by Reginald Chapman against Eileen O'Neill Burke in her official capacity as the Cook County State’s Attorney (having succeeded Kim Foxx).The case centers on the fallout from the plaintiff’s prior criminal conviction and subsequent exoneration, with Chapman alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during the original prosecution and subsequent post-conviction proceedings.A primary factual issue involves the "wrongful conviction" framework, specifically whether the State’s Attorney's Office maintained a policy or custom of withholding exculpatory evidence or failing to investigate credible leads that would have proven the plaintiff’s innocence years earlier.The defendant, Eileen O'Neill Burke, moved to dismiss the claims based on prosecutorial immunity, arguing that the actions taken by her office—even if allegedly improper—were performed as part of the judicial process and are therefore shielded from civil liability.The factual record explores the distinction between "administrative" actions and "prosecutorial" functions; the plaintiff contends that the withholding of evidence occurred during the investigative phase, where immunity is more limited.In early 2025, a district court judge granted a motion to dismiss several of the plaintiff’s claims but allowed the central cause of action regarding the office's "disclosure policies" to proceed to the appellate level for clarification.The appeal, docketed as 25-1311, focuses on whether the State’s Attorney’s Office can be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services for systemic failures in its Brady disclosure protocols that allegedly led to Chapman's prolonged and wrongful incarceration.During the oral arguments on February 18, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel examined whether the newly elected State’s Attorney can be substituted as a defendant in a way that maintains the plaintiff’s claims against the office as a whole.The court also scrutinized whether the plaintiff’s allegations met the "plausibility" standard required to survive a motion to dismiss, specifically regarding the existence of a widespread pattern of misconduct within the Cook County State's Attorney's Office.

Case Summary:Gemini saidIn the case of Kimberly Ballard v. Ameren Illinois Company (Docket No. 25-1562), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 17, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The plaintiff, Kimberly Ballard, was hired by Ameren Illinois in August 2013 to serve as an energy efficiency advisor.In February 2015, while attending a work-related conference, the plaintiff suffered a fall that resulted in a serious wrist injury requiring multiple surgeries.The plaintiff alleges that following her injury, she was subjected to ongoing disability discrimination and harassment by management, which persisted despite her internal reports of the conduct.The dispute culminated in the plaintiff’s termination from Ameren on February 26, 2018, an action she contends was retaliatory for her complaints regarding her treatment and disability status.Following her discharge, the plaintiff submitted a Complainant Information Sheet (CIS) to the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) in August 2018, requesting an investigation and a cross-filing of her claims with the EEOC.A critical factual and procedural issue in the litigation is whether the filing of this information sheet constituted a formal "charge" of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).In January 2025, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling that the plaintiff had failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies because her formal EEOC charge was filed more than 300 days after her termination.The current appeal, docketed as 25-1562, challenges the trial court's reliance on Seventh Circuit precedent (Carlson v. Christian Bros. Servs.) to determine that the initial information sheet did not satisfy the filing requirements.During the oral arguments on February 17, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel examined whether the plaintiff’s intent to initiate an investigation through the IDHR information sheet was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for her federal claims.

Case Summary:In the case of Schwetz v. The Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) of Nassau County (Docket No. 24-2957), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 13, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The plaintiff, Patricia Schwetz, was a long-time employee of Nassau BOCES who was promoted to the position of Executive Director of Special Education in September 2018.The litigation centers on allegations of gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New York State Human Rights Law.A primary factual dispute involves a 2019 directive from the BOCES District Superintendent, Dr. Robert Dillon, for Schwetz to rescind an employment offer made to a job candidate whom the Superintendent deemed unqualified.Schwetz alleges that after she expressed concerns that rescinding the offer was discriminatory, the Superintendent began challenging her own professional qualifications and performance for the first time in her tenure.The factual record also includes an incident involving an error in data submission to the New York State Education Department, for which Schwetz claims she was unfairly disciplined after opposing a proposal to submit incorrect data.In September 2024, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of BOCES, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the adverse employment actions were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory intent rather than legitimate business reasons.The current appeal, docketed as 24-2957, challenges the dismissal of the suit, with the plaintiff arguing that the trial court ignored material evidence of a "pretextual" campaign to undermine her authority following her protected complaints.During the oral arguments on February 13, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the temporal proximity between Schwetz’s internal complaints and the subsequent scrutiny of her performance was sufficient to warrant a jury trial.

Case Summary:In the case of Cornett v. Banks (Docket No. 25-830), which was argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 13, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation was initiated by the parents of J.B., a student with multiple severe disabilities including traumatic brain injury and cerebral palsy, against the New York City Department of Education (DOE) and its Chancellor.The plaintiffs allege that the DOE failed to provide J.B. with a Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) for the 2022–2023 school year as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).A central factual dispute in the record is the appropriateness of the Individualized Education Program (IEP) developed by the DOE, which recommended placing the student in a specialized public school (P.S. Q256).The parents rejected the public placement and unilaterally enrolled J.B. in iBRAIN, a private school specializing in brain injuries, and subsequently sought tuition reimbursement from the city.In the initial administrative hearing, an Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) found that the DOE failed to provide a FAPE because the proposed public school could not actually implement the specific medical and educational supports required by J.B.’s IEP.However, a State Review Officer (SRO) later reversed that decision, concluding that the IHO’s findings regarding the public school's inability to implement the IEP were "impermissibly speculative."In early 2025, a federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOE, upholding the SRO's determination that a FAPE had been offered and denying the parents' claim for tuition reimbursement.The current appeal, docketed as 25-830, challenges that ruling, with the plaintiffs arguing that the district court failed to give due weight to the factual evidence regarding the public school's lack of necessary medical facilities and trained staff.During the oral arguments on February 13, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the DOE is required to prove a school's capacity to implement an IEP before a student actually attends, or if such challenges remain premature until a failure to implement occurs.

Case Summary:In the case of Gary Betts v. Boone County, Illinois (Docket No. 25-1685), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 13, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation stems from the 1977 murder of Louise Betts, whose remains were believed by her family to have been handled and buried intact by the then-Boone County Coroner, Wesley Hyland.In November 2022, forty-four years after the burial, the Boone County Coroner’s Office revealed that the late Coroner Hyland had secretly and illegally retained Louise Betts' skull, along with the remains of other individuals, in his private possession.Upon learning of this discovery, the plaintiffs, Gary and Earl Betts, were forced to disinter their sister's remains to reunite them with the recovered skull and provide her with a complete and proper burial.The plaintiffs filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Boone County and the current Coroner, alleging that the unauthorized retention of the remains constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.A primary factual and legal issue at the trial level was whether Illinois law recognizes a "property interest" in a dead body sufficient to trigger federal constitutional protections.The district court initially found that while Illinois law treats a dead body as "quasi-property" for the purpose of burial rights, the plaintiffs had standing to sue because the injury—the interference with their right to possess the remains—accrued only upon the discovery of the coroner's secret misconduct.In March 2025, however, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish Monell liability because the late coroner’s secret, illegal actions did not constitute an "official policy or widespread custom" of Boone County.The court reasoned that because Hyland’s actions were hidden and would have resulted in his immediate removal if known, his conduct was a "departure from policy" rather than an implementation of one.The current appeal, docketed as 25-1685, challenges this dismissal, with the plaintiffs arguing that as the elected Coroner, Hyland was the final policymaker for the county regarding the disposition of human remains, making his actions attributable to the municipality.During the oral arguments on February 13, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel focused on whether a single official's "discretionary decision" to break the law can ever establish municipal liability if that official is the highest-ranking authority in their specific department.

Case Summary:Gemini saidIn the case of Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. FERC (Docket No. 25-1007), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on February 12, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation centers on a dispute between Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. (MDU) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding the management of power grid congestion at the "Charlie Creek to Watford City" flowgate (Flowgate 5717) located in North Dakota.The factual conflict began in April 2023 when the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) initiated "Market-to-Market" (M2M) coordination with the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) to manage congestion on this specific transmission line.MDU, which operates generation facilities in the region, filed a formal complaint alleging that this coordination was unauthorized because the congestion was a "wholly local" constraint that did not meet the necessary regional impact criteria defined in the Joint Operating Agreement between MISO and SPP.The utility company contended that the M2M coordination resulted in "duplicative" and "unwarranted" payments that were ultimately passed down to its customers without providing a corresponding regional benefit.FERC issued a series of orders in 2024 and 2025 (188 FERC ¶ 61,168 and 190 FERC ¶ 61,162) denying MDU's complaint and subsequent requests for rehearing, finding that the coordination was consistent with established technical protocols and "shift factor" sensitivity studies.MDU's appeal, docketed as 25-1007, challenges the agency’s reliance on these technical studies, arguing that the Commission failed to address MDU’s evidence that no MISO-side generation was actually available to relieve the local constraint.The central factual question before the court is whether the administrative record supports FERC's conclusion that the congestion on Flowgate 5717 possessed a "significant" enough impact on the adjacent market to justify the inter-regional coordination charges.During the oral arguments on February 12, 2026, the Eighth Circuit panel examined whether FERC's refusal to order refunds for the contested payments was based on a "reasonable explanation" or if the agency ignored material evidence regarding the local nature of the grid constraint.

Case Summary:In the case of ColonialWebb Contractors Company v. Hill Phoenix, Inc. (Docket No. 24-1237), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on February 12, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation began as a commercial contract dispute between ColonialWebb Contractors Company, a Richmond-based mechanical contractor, and Hill Phoenix, Inc., a manufacturer of commercial refrigeration systems.The underlying conflict involves two separate lawsuits originally filed in state court regarding performance issues and payment disputes related to a large-scale construction or refrigeration project.Hill Phoenix sought to remove the litigation to federal court, but in doing so, it consolidated the two distinct state cases into a single federal filing.The district court subsequently issued an order to remand the action back to state court, concluding that Hill Phoenix had improperly consolidated the two cases during the removal process.The primary legal issue on appeal is whether the Fourth Circuit has the jurisdiction to review a district court’s remand order when that order is based on a finding of improper consolidation rather than a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The factual record includes arguments regarding the "voluntary-involuntary" rule, which governs when a case becomes removable to federal court based on the actions of the plaintiff versus the defendant.ColonialWebb contends that the remand is not reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which generally bars appellate review of remand orders to prevent lengthy delays in reaching a trial on the merits.During the oral arguments on February 12, 2026, held at the University of Virginia School of Law, the appellate panel focused on whether the procedural "defect" of improper consolidation falls under the statutory exceptions that allow for federal appellate intervention.

Case Summary:In the case of LeadingAge Minnesota v. Nicole Blissenbach (Docket No. 25-2252), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on February 11, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The lawsuit was filed by LeadingAge Minnesota and Care Providers of Minnesota, representing over 1,000 senior care providers, to challenge a new labor rule promulgated by the Minnesota Nursing Home Workforce Standards Board.The challenged rule mandates that, effective January 1, 2025, nursing home employers must pay "holiday pay" at a rate of time-and-a-half to specific categories of staff working on designated holidays.A central factual element of the rule is a "modification provision" that allows employers to substitute holidays or change work hours only if they obtain agreement from a majority of affected workers or their exclusive union representative.The plaintiffs contend that this provision effectively forces non-union employers to engage in a quasi-collective bargaining process with their employees to determine compensation and scheduling terms.The legal record focuses on whether the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempts this state-level rule by infringing on the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate collective bargaining and labor-management relations.The district court previously denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the holiday pay mandate did not sufficiently interfere with the federal labor law framework to warrant a pre-enforcement block.On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the rule places nursing home operators in an impossible position: they must either comply with a state-mandated voting process that mimics union activity or risk significant state penalties for non-compliance.During the oral arguments on February 11, 2026, the Eighth Circuit panel examined whether the state’s interest in setting "minimum employment standards" can legally coexist with federal laws that govern how those standards are negotiated between workers and management.