Philosophy Voiced

In this podcast, Olli Lagerspetz & Silvia Caprioglio Panizza, the two current Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellows (2022) at the Centre for Ethics discuss their EU-funded projects, the value of carrying them out at the Centre, and similarities between their philosophical interests. SCP's project, Moral Impossibility: Rethinking Choice and Conflict (MIGHT), focuses on the scope of what is possible for the subject in a moral sense, and how the range of possibilities that we have available is important in determining what our choices are and mean, as well as in revealing our deepest moral commitments. In this conversation she outlines various forms of moral impossibility, with one extended example from animal testing, and applies the research question to other contemporary issues such as the war in Ukraine, concluding with further applications and interdisciplinary directions for the project. – In his project, Philosophy as Cultural Self-Knowledge: R. G. Collingwood, Peter Winch and the Human Sciences (WC-CULT), OL discusses the role of the humanities and social sciences. History is neither sacred memory nor litigation – as it too often seems in the present war – but targeted inquiries. As with philosophy, the value of the human sciences lies in that they enhance the self-knowledge and self-understanding of cultures and societies. Olli also talks about his finds in the posthumous Peter Winch and R. G. Collingwood Archives. Read along with the transcript here: https://centreforethics.upce.cz/en/transcript-interview-msca-scholars-silvia-caprioglio-panizza-and-olli-lagerspetz

In this episode of Philosophy Voiced, Olli Lagerspetz, Giuseppina D’Oro, Leonidas Tsilipakos, and Jonas Ahlskog discuss their workshop 'Idealism and Realism in the Human Sciences: Collingwood, Winch, and Beyond' which took place in Pardubice, Czech Republic September 22 and 23, 2022. About the workshop: R.G. Collingwood and Peter Winch were central contributors to the debate on the question of the autonomy of the human sciences (social sciences and the humanities) in the mid- 20th century. Other participants in that debate were Donald Davidson, Charles Taylor and G.H. von Wright. According to von Wright's formulation, the aim of the human sciences was "understanding" rather than "explanation", whereas Davidson argued, on the contrary, that explanation of action in terms of reasons must, in the last analysis, presuppose that reasons have causal efficacy. The debate was not resolved, one reason being the general philosophical shift in the late 20th century. Due to that shift, ontology again entered mainstream analytical philosophy as a topic. With this development, naturalism and scientific realism gained currency as the philosophical paradigm in English-speaking philosophy. In the light of that development, it became customary to view Collingwood and Winch as idealists and/or relativists. The aim of the workshop is to explore connections between views on the epistemological status of the human sciences and general underlying issues on the nature of philosophical research. More about Doc. Olli Lagerspetz's project: Philosophy as Cultural Self-Knowledge: R. G. Collingwood, Peter Winch and the Human Sciences (WC-Cult)Podcast editor: Patrick KeenanPodcast photo by Leonidas Tsilipakos.

In this podcast PhD students Peter Tuck and Vladimir Lukić speak with Professor Roger Crisp on his paper Towards a Global Hedonism. Professor Crisp is one of the two keynotes (with Doctor Debbie Roberts) at the upcoming PhD conference: What Really Matters? Reflections on Human Values taking place August 24-26 at the University of Pardubice, Czech Republic. (for more information on the conference, email: cfeconference2022@outlook.com)Professor Crisp is Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University and Uehiro fellow and tutor in philosophy at St. Anne's College, Oxford. His work falls principally within the field of ethics. Roger has written several books including but not limited to:Reasons and the good (2006), The cosmos of duty: Henry Sidgwick's Methods of ethics (2018), &Sacrifice regained: morality and self-interest in British moral philosophy from Hobbes to Bentham (2019).Here is the abstract forTowards a Global HedonismThis chapter argues that, of all alleged values of any kind, only pleasure is of ultimate axiological significance. It begins with the suggestion that absolute value—the value some item has through possessing a lower-order evaluative property that makes the world in which it is instantiated good—is foundational. Pleasantness is characterised as a basic category of phenomenal consciousness, and the charge of reductionism against hedonism based on this conception is refuted. Defences of hedonism against various forms of objection that it is counter-intuitive are modelled on an analogy with defences of consequentialism, and the general position is then applied to moral, aesthetic, and epistemic value. It is claimed that those attracted by the parsimony and elegance of welfarism (the view that the fundamental value is well-being) might find these qualities within hedonism in particular.podcast edited by Patrick Keenan

In this episode of Philosophy Voiced, we are joined through Zoom by Samantha Ashenden, Reader in the Politics Department at Birkbeck, University of London, and Andreas Hess, Professor in the School of Sociology at University College Dublin.Hosts Matti Syiem, Philip Strammer, and Patrick Keenan discuss with Sam and Andreas their article in Aeon "The theorist of belonging: Discovering Judith Shklar's liberalism of fear", their edited book Between Utopia and Realism, and Judith Shklar's essay Liberalism of Fear, among other topics relating to the political theory of Judith Shklar.Sam and Andreas are the keynote speakers on the third night of the Centre for Ethics' upcoming conference, Looking Forward in Hope and Despair: Critical Perspectives on Utopia and Dystopia in Philosophy and the Arts. They will present at 15:00 (CET) on April 16th a presentation titled: "Why virtues will no longer do: some pros and cons of dystopian perspectives." More info on the conference here: https://philevents.org/event/show/85474

In this episode, Niklas Forsberg, Antony Fredriksson, and Hugo Strandberg discuss the philosophy of Werner Herzog in light of Antony's recently published paper titled "Werner Herzog and the Documentary as a Revelatory Practice" (The Philosophy of Werner Herzog [2020] edited by M. Blake & Christopher Turner, Lexington Books)

In this episode, the Centre for Ethics as Study in Human Value senior researchers Niklas Forsberg, Kamila Pacovská, Nora Hämäläinen, and Ondřej Beran share their thoughts on what makes the Centre for Ethics special, what philosophy is like at the Centre, what their personal academic influences are, and what they are personally working on.https://centreforethics.upce.cz/

Dr. Anna Bergqvist has been a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University since January 2013. Before coming to MMU, Dr. Bergqvist was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Glasgow and Stockholm University. Before that she was an AHRC funded PhD student at the University of Reading where she worked with Professor Jonathan Dancy on the epistemology of Moral Particularism. She currently supervises doctoral work on Particularism and Wittgenstein at Edge Hill University. Her research specialisms are Metaethics and Aesthetics, and selected issues in Philosophy of Language and Perception. "The moral life is not intermittent or specialised, it is not a peculiar or separate area of our existence . . . . we are all always deploying and redirecting our energy, refining or blunting it, purifying or corrupting it . . . ‘Sensibility’ is a word which may be in place here . . . Happenings in consciousness so vague as to be almost non-existent can have ‘moral colour’. (‘But are you saying that every single second has a moral tag?’ Yes, roughly.) "--- Iris Murdoch. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals: 495https://centreforethics.upce.cz/Niklas.Forsberg@upce.cz

Niklas Forsberg, the Head of Research for the Centre for Ethics at the University of Pardubice, hosts Cora Diamond and James Conant for a lengthy discussion following their Truth in Ethics intensive seminar, which took place October 19-21 of 2018."[I]t is my firm conviction that despite its real or apparent division into departments, philosophy is one subject, a single discipline. By this I do not merely mean that between different areas of philosophy there are cross-references, as when, for example, one encounters in ethics the problem whether such and such principles fall within the epistemological classification of a priori knowledge. I mean (or hope I mean) something a good deal stronger than this, something more like the thesis that it is not possible to reach full understanding of, or high level proficiency in, any one department without a corresponding understanding and proficiency in the others; to the extent that when I visit an unfamiliar university and (as occasionally happens) I am introduced to, ‘Mr Puddle, our man in Political Philosophy’ (or in ‘Nineteenth-century continental philosophy’ or ‘Aesthetics’, as the case may be), I am immediately confident that either Mr Puddle is being under-described and in consequence maligned, or else Mr Puddle is not really good at his stuff. Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. Or, one might even dare to say, there is only one problem in philosophy, namely all of them." (Paul Grice, "Reply to Richards” (in Richard Grandy and Richard Warner, eds., Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 64.