Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (Floor Audio)

One evening in October 2021, the applicant was driving in rural southwestern Ontario. The sun had set and it was dark. The posted speed limit on the highway the applicant was using was 80km/h; he was travelling at least 116km/h. A horse-drawn buggy entered the roadway at an intersection. The applicant did not see the buggy in time to stop; his vehicle collided with it. Both occupants of the buggy died from injuries sustained in the collision. During the police investigation that night, the applicant admitted to being a chronic marijuana smoker and consented to providing two samples of his blood. Evidence established that the applicant’s blood drug concentration (“BDC”) exceeded the prescribed limit at the time of the collision. The parties agreed at trial that there was no evidence of a causal nexus between the applicant’s BDC and the collision. The applicant was charged with operating a conveyance with an excess BDC under s. 320.14(1)(c), two counts of committing an offence under s. 320.14(1)(c) causing death under s. 320.14(3), and two counts of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death under s. 320.13(3).The trial judge held that it is insufficient that the applicant had a prohibited BDC and was operating a conveyance at the time he caused a death; a conviction for offences under s. 320.14(3) requires a causal nexus between an accused’s BDC and the death of a victim. As the parties have agreed that there is no causal nexus between the applicant’s BDC and the death of the victims, the applicant was acquitted on those counts.The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of s. 320.14(3). A plain reading establishes that the elements are made out simply by operating a vehicle with excess BDC, and causing the death of a person. No causal nexus between the excess BDC and the cause of death is required. Accused persons retain the benefit of the basic legal causation standard: the Crown must prove that the applicant’s actions were a significant contributing cause of death. Because of the trial judge’s erroneous interpretation of s. 320.14(3), he did not make any finding as to whether the Crown had proven legal causation on this standard. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered a new trial on these counts. Argued Date 2026-03-17 Keywords Criminal law — Causing death while operating conveyance with excess blood drug concentration — Causation — Whether causal nexus required between blood drug concentration and death of victim — Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to life, liberty and security of person — Whether s. 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code violates s. 7 of the Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 320.14(3) Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ms. Korduner was a motor vehicle driver involved in a two-vehicle accident. A responding police officer questioned her at the scene for approximately three minutes, during which she stated that she should not have been driving because she was drunk. Ms. Korduner was arrested for impaired operation of a motor vehicle. She refused to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device and was charged for refusing to provide a breath sample. In voir dire proceedings to determine the admissibility of Ms. Korduner’s statements, the trial judge held that Ms. Korduner’s statements were compelled by the Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, and were inadmissible pursuant to the use immunity principle; reliance on s. 320.31(9) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as a basis for admitting the statements would breach Ms. Korduner’s rights under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and Crown counsel failed to prove the breach was justified pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter. The charges were dismissed. The Court of King’s Bench of Alberta dismissed a summary conviction appeal. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Alberta allowed an appeal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2026-02-17 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Principles of fundamental justice — Self-incrimination — Criminal law — Evidence — Use immunity — Remedies — Police officer responding to motor vehicle accident questioning driver involved in accident — Statements by driver causing officer to demand breath samples in order to administer approved roadside screening device — Trial judge declaring statements to officer compelled by Traffic Safety Act — Section 320.31(9) of Criminal Code setting out that a statement to a peace officer including statement compelled under provincial Act admissible in evidence for purpose of justifying demand to provide breath sample — Whether s. 320.31(9) infringes s. 7 of Charter — If so, whether limit reasonable and demonstrably justified pursuant to s. 1 of Charter — If not, appropriate remedy — Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, ss. 69(1), 71(1) — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 320.21(9). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Confidentiality order)Following the Canadian general election held on April 28, 2025, and the subsequent judicial recount, the respondent Tatiana Auguste became a member of Parliament for the electoral district of Terrebonne. Only one vote in her favour separated her from her closest rival, the appellant, Nathalie Sinclair-Desgagné. One voter then notified the media that her special ballot, mailed within the prescribed time, had been returned to her after the polling day, marked [translation] “Moved or unknown – return to sender”. In fact, there was an error in the postal code that the returning officer placed on the prepaid envelope sent to the voter in that the last three characters of the postal code were for somewhere other than the polling station. But that voter maintained that she voted for Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné.The Superior Court found that there was no irregularity within the meaning of s. 524(1)(b) of the Canada Elections Act. It therefore dismissed the application to contest the election filed by Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné. Argued Date 2026-02-13 Keywords Elections — Application to contest election — Irregularity — Allegations of irregularities that affected result of election made by candidate defeated by single vote in federal election — Whether trial judge erred in interpretation of notion of irregularity — Whether trial judge erred in determination of consequences of irregularity on integrity of electoral system — Whether trial judge erred in imposing burden much greater than that under Canada Elections Act on voter — Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 524(1)b), 531(2). Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Sophia Hemmings was left with a severe brain injury after suffering cardiac arrest during a caesarean section at the respondent Scarborough Hospital (hereafter, the “Hospital”).The appellants, Sophia Hemmings, by her Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, Rosalie Brown personally, Samantha Camile Gayle and Moses Hemmings, minors by their Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, and Samantha Hemmings, commenced an action against a number of health care practitioners, alleging that their negligence had caused Sophia’s injuries. The parties agreed on the amount of her damages. The action went to trial, solely on the issue of liability.At trial, Lloyd Gregory Padmore, Dr. Neil Thomas Jamensky, and the Hospital were found liable in negligence. The Court of Appeal allowed appeals brought by Dr. Padmore and the Hospital, and set the judgment as against them aside. The appeal brought by Dr. Jamensky was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-02-10 Keywords Torts – Professional liability – Negligence – Causation – Mother suffering severe brain injury following cardiac arrest during delivery of child by caesarian section – Application of law of causation by Canadian courts – How principles of causation to be applied in the context of women’s healthcare in Canada – What is required to show factual causation and how Courts should engage with counterfactual analyses – What is required to show legal causation and demonstrate meaningful contemplation of applicable testCivil procedure –Trial – Judgments – Reasons for judgment – Appeals – What is the permissible nature and extent of appellate courts’ power to review trial record when assessing sufficiency of reasons that are, on their face, deficient Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Robert Joseph DeSutter, was charged with various sexual offences and one charge of assault, in relation to three different complainants, M.H., S.H. and J.R. The trial judge acquitted the respondent of all charges except the assault charge, finding insufficient evidence of a sexual purpose in the respondent’s actions and the lack of an exploitative relationship. The appellant Crown appealed the acquittals in relation to two counts of sexual exploitation (counts 3 and 14), alleging that the trial judge erred in law by excluding from evidence images of women found on a USB stick and concluding that the respondent was not in an exploitative relationship with one of the complainants, J.R. The majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Crown had not met its burden of establishing an error of law on the part of the trial judge justifying appellate intervention. In contrast, Derrick J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on counts 3 and 14. She found that the trial judge erred in her analysis of the USB images’ probative value and prejudicial effect. She also found that the trial judge failed to properly assess the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R., given the power imbalance and J.R.’s vulnerability. In her view, these errors could have materially affected the verdicts, warranting a new trial on the two counts of sexual exploitation. Argued Date 2025-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Assessment — Whether the trial judge erred in her analysis of the admissibility of the images on the USB — Whether the trial judge erred in her assessment of the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-20 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch’s application for judicial review was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-01-15 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Two fictitious advertisements were published by the police on Internet sites offering escort services; the text of the advertisements highlighted the youthfulness of the people. Mr. Denis communicated with someone who turned out to be a police officer acting in an undercover capacity. She stated that she mentioned the young girl’s age at least four times but that Mr. Denis did not react to that information. He was arrested by the police when he entered the room where the “escort” was.Following the trial, Mr. Denis was convicted of the offence under s. 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code (communication for the purpose of obtaining sexual services for consideration from a person under the age of 18 years). He brought a motion to have the mandatory minimum sentence declared invalid and of no force or effect. The trial judge, considering the six month minimum sentence to be appropriate, did not conduct the Charter analysis. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part to rule on the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentence and declare it invalid and of no force or effect, in accordance with s. 52(1) of the Charter. Argued Date 2026-01-13 Keywords Criminal law — Abuse of process — Entrapment — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — Mandatory minimum sentence — Commodification of sexual activity as regards person under age of 18 years — Whether s. 286.1(2)(a) of Criminal Code breaches s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 286.1 — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12, 24(1) and 52(1). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).