The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal cost the US Navy two rear admirals and six warships — yet it stopped 11 Japanese transports carrying 10,000 troops and the supplies needed to take Henderson Field. We discuss the critical 12–15 November 1942 engagements where Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan's cruisers intercepted a battleship bombardment force, and Willis Lee's radar-directed gunnery from USS Washington sank the Kirishima in the war's only battleship-versus-battleship duel in the Pacific. Key learnings: • Why Henderson Field functioned as the decisive terrain controlling both sides' ability to resupply by day or by night • How only 2,000 Japanese troops landed from the convoy — most without weapons or ammunition • What the Fifth Battle of the Matanikau plan revealed about American intelligence failures on Japanese defensive positions Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Full show notes and transcript: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/ Support the podcast: https://www.patreon.com/principlesofwar More episodes: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/ Follow on X: https://x.com/surprisepodcast Subscribe for more Professional Military Education content.

This is the sixth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland. This episodes discusses: How close did Japanese forces come to capturing Henderson Field in September 1942? Why was Edson's Ridge the key terrain for defending Guadalcanal's airfield? How did pre-registered artillery fire shape the outcome on Edson's Ridge? What command decisions did Edson make when his defensive plan began to unravel? How did the Marines adapt to Japanese infiltration tactics during the night attacks? In what ways did Edson's Ridge save the Cactus Air Force? Why did Kawaguchi underestimate the Marines defending Henderson Field? What leadership failures forced the September purge of underperforming Marine officers? How did logistics and fatigue shape the Marines' combat effectiveness on the ridge? What lessons from Edson's Ridge matter for modern all-arms defensive planning? Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this episode. https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

This is the fourth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland. This episodes discusses: How did the Marines employ the 37 mm gun firing canister at Alligator Creek? Why did Colonel Ichiki attack without heavy weapons— trading firepower for speed and what was the cost? What are the myths about scout Jacob Vouza? How did barbed wire obstacles and coconut-log bunkers employed for to create an engagement zone? How did pre-registered fires shape the Battle of Tenaru? What early warnings did coastwatchers and patrols provide before the assault? How did Marine tanks at dawn finish the fight across the sandbar? What role did the Cactus Air Force play in the Battle of Tenaru? Was Ichiki killed in action or by seppuku—what's the best evidence? What operational lessons from Tenaru guided both sides at Henderson Field? Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this episode.

This is the second episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland. Shoestring invasion planning Koro rehearsals fiasco Risking the aircraft carriers vs time to unload the convoy Crutchley's covering cruisers Rupertus leads Tulagi Blue Beach landing Fighting at "the Cut" Improvised cave tactics Gavutu–Tanambogo battles Tanks combat Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this episode.

This is the final episode of three in our series from our interview with Retired Colonel John Antal discussing his research into contemporary combat and how technology is changing the modern battlefield. John makes a series of great points during the interview: Modern War Is Fought in a Transparent Battlespace Visibility through drones, sensors, and AI means traditional massing of forces is now lethal. You must deceive and disrupt enemy sensors or be destroyed. Masking Should Be a Principle of War Masking = multi-domain deception to confuse enemy ISR. Use decoys, optical/thermal camouflage, and emission control—make the enemy see what you want them to see. Camouflage and Concealment Are Critically Neglected Western armies (incl. U.S. and Australian) have virtually no meaningful camouflage training. Without drones for perspective or thermal checks, soldiers can't learn what the enemy sees. Command Posts Are Death Traps Tents and Winnebago-style mobile HQs are vulnerable to drone and artillery strikes. Forces must restructure command posts: smaller, distributed, better masked, and mobile. Infiltration Is the Primary Tactic of Modern War Seen in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and Gaza, infiltration bypasses strongpoints and succeeds in high-transparency environments where massing is suicidal. Mobile Phones Kill Units Civilian phones constantly emit signals. Unless militaries ban personal devices or deploy secure comms, they invite precision targeting. Drones Are the Machine Guns of the 21st Century Drones must be ubiquitous, especially at the squad level. But to manage this, armies need a dedicated drone corps—trained, maintained, and operationalised like any combat arm. Resilience Beats Exquisite Systems Over-reliance on billion-dollar platforms (e.g., B-2s, F-35s) is a strategic risk. Operation Spiderweb Cheap drones can destroy exquisite systems. Forces must be able to take hits and continue fighting. Training Is Outdated and Unrealistic Many exercises simulate conventional war (e.g., Desert Storm) rather than dispersed, dark, denied environments. We fall to the level of our training—not rise to our expectations. Leaders Must Prepare for First Strike and Distributed Ops The enemy will hit first. Western forces must train to disperse, operate without emissions, reassemble fast, and strike with real-time decision-making. The key: agility, initiative, and survivability. Check out the show notes for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

How is the modern battlefield changing? What role is technology like Artificial Intelligence, drones, precision strike and electronic warfare changing command and control, ISR and combined arms? This is the first of 3 episodes with retired Colonel John Antal, who has studied 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh, recent Israeli battles and the war in Ukraine. Check out the show notes for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

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