The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 24-889 24-889 HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS V. AMARIN PHARMA, INC. DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1370 CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act "[t]o facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow." Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S , 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012). Recognizing that many drugs are approved for both patented and unpatented uses, Congress sought to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones." Id . at 415. The statutory mechanism is a "skinny label": Generic drugmakers "carve out" patented uses from their labels, leaving only instructions to use generic drugs for their unpatented uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). Congress designed this carve-out mechanism to encourage competition and to protect generic drugmakers from allegations that marketing a generic drug for an unpatented use "actively induces infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). After all, active inducement requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"-there is no "liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use." Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 & n.11 (2005). The questions presented are: 1. When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the generic drugmaker calls its product a "generic version" and cites public information about the branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use? 2. Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or even mentions, the patented use? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2023-1169

Cisco Systems v. Doe I | 04/28/26 | Docket #: 24-856 24-856 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. V. DOE I DECISION BELOW: 73 F.4th 700 GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 3 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Whether the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting. 2. Whether, if ATS aiding-and-abetting claims are cognizable, mere knowledge rather than purpose suffices to show the requisite mens rea. 3. Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, allows a judicially- implied private right of action for aiding and abetting. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 15-16909

Chatrie v. United States | 04/27/26 | Docket #: 25-112 25-112 CHATRIE V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 136 F.4th 100 LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: This case concerns the constitutionality of geofence warrants. For cell phone users to use certain services, their cell phones must continuously transmit their exact locations to their service providers. A geofence warrant allows law enforcement to obtain, from the service provider, the identities of users who were in the vicinity of a particular location at a particular time. In this case, law enforcement obtained, and served on Google, a geofence warrant seeking anonymized location data for every device within 150 meters of the location of a bank robbery within one hour of the robbery. After Google returned an initial list, law enforcement sought - without seeking an additional warrant - information about the movements of certain devices for a longer, two-hour period, and Google complied with that request as well. Then - again without seeking an additional warrant-law enforcement requested de-anonymized subscriber information for three devices. One of those devices belonged to petitioner Okello Chatrie. Based on the evidence derived from the geofence warrant, petitioner was convicted of armed robbery. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the execution of the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 2. Whether the exclusionary rule should apply to the evidence derived from the geofence warrant. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-4489

FCC v. AT&T | 04/21/26 | Docket #: 25-406 25-406 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION V. AT&T DECISION BELOW: 149 F.4th 491 CONSOLIDATED WITH 25-567 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq ., empowers the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to assess monetary forfeiture penalties for certain violations of the Act or the FCC's regulations by issuing a notice of apparent liability, giving the regulated party an opportunity to respond in writing, and then issuing a final decision. If the regulated party declines to pay and the government sues to collect the penalties, the regulated party is entitled to a de novo jury trial in a federal district court. Alternatively, the subject of an FCC forfeiture order may pay the monetary penalty and file a petition for review in a court of appeals, thereby triggering a judicial-review proceeding in which no jury is available. The question presented is as follows: Whether the Communications Act provisions that govern the FCC's assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures are consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-60223

Sripetch v. SEC | 04/20/26 | Docket #: 25-466 25-466 SRIPETCH V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION DECISION BELOW: 154 F.4th 980 CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over an exceptionally important question regarding the SEC's civil-enforcement power. In Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020), this Court held the SEC may seek equitable "disgorgement" in civil-enforcement actions if an award "does not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits" and "is awarded for victims ." 591 U.S. at 74- 75 (emphasis added). In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit held that investors can be ''victims" for disgorgement purposes despite not suffering pecuniary harm. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit recognized a direct "split" on this question, "reject[ed] the reasoning of the Second Circuit," and "joined the First Circuit in holding that a finding of pecuniary harm is not required." This statutory holding was the sole basis of the Ninth Circuit's decision, and it leaves the SEC's enforcement power in disarray: disgorgement requests are ubiquitous in SEC actions, and there are now conflicting rules in the two main circuits (the Second and Ninth) where enforcement actions are most prominent. There are millions (if not billions) of dollars at stake. The question presented is: Whether the SEC may seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm . LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3830

Pitchford v. Cain | 03/31/26 | Docket #: 24-7351 24-7351 PITCHFORD V. CAIN DECISION BELOW: 126 F.4th 422 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-70009 QUESTION PRESENTED: District Attorney Doug Evans convicted Terry Pitchford, aged 18 years at the time of the crime, of capital murder and secured a death verdict in the Grenada Circuit Court before Judge Joseph Loper on February 9, 2006, with the entirety of jury selection and opening arguments taking place on February 6. After direct and collateral reviews in state court, the Northern District of Mississippi granted habeas corpus relief upon concluding that the trial court failed to determine the plausibility of the prosecutor ’ s proffered reasons for peremptorily striking four Black venire members or otherwise consider the full circumstances bearing upon whether Mr. Evans ’ s reasons for striking any and each of these four venire members was pretextual and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing, the District Court ruled the state supreme court ’ s reliance on its waiver jurisprudence improperly foreclosed consideration of pretext under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Judge Loper implicitly made determinations for each of the four strikes, trial counsel waived argument of pretext, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi ’ s waiver jurisprudence comports with Batson. This opinion in Pitchford v. Cain confirmed the Fifth Circuit ’ s disavowal of earlier circuit jurisprudence recognizing, inter alia, that since Miller-El v. Dretke , 545 U.S. 231 (2005) ( Miller-El II ), capital petitioners had been unable to “ waive[] any Batson claim based on a comparison analysis, ” Woodward v. Epps , 580 F.3d 318, 338 (5th Cir. 2009), deepening the Fifth Circuit ’ s split, joined by two other circuits, with the majority of courts of appeals in the application of Batson . This petition presents the following questions: 1. Does clearly established federal law determined by this Court and applied in six other circuits require reversal of a state appellate court ’ s denial of relief from a capital prosecutor ’ s discriminatory exercise of four peremptory strikes against Black venire members wherein the trial court, for each of the four strikes, failed to determine “ the plausibility of the reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it ”? Miller-El II , 545 U.S at 251–52. 2. Does Mississippi Supreme Court precedent, which deems waived on direct review arguments of pretext not stated in the trial record, defy this Court ’ s clearly established federal law under Batson ? 3. Does a finding of waiver on a trial record possessing Batson objections, defense counsel efforts to argue the objection, and the trial court ’ s express assurance the issues were preserved, constitute an unreasonable determination of facts? GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER, UNDER THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d), THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT UNREASONABLY DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO REBUT THE PROSECUTOR'S ASSERTED RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR EXERCISING PEREMPTORY STRIKES AGAINST FOUR BLACK JURORS. ORDER OF MARCH 30 , 2026 : THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED. CERT. GRANTED 12/15/2025

Abouammo v. United States | 03/30/26 | Docket #: 25-5146 25-5146 ABOUAMMO V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 122 F.4th 1072 GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: As part of an investigation into a scheme to disclose nonpublic Twitter account information to foreign actors, San Francisco-based FBI agents visited Petitioner Ahmad Abouammo at his home in Seattle. While they were there, Mr. Abouammo went upstairs and emailed them an allegedly falsified document. Mr. Abouammo's only interaction with the agents occurred in Seattle. A grand jury in the Northern District of California indicted Mr. Abouammo for (among other things) falsifying documents with the intent to impede an investigation. The parties then agreed to toll the statute of limitations for other uncharged offenses. On the day the tolling agreement expired, the government filed a superseding information adding various felony counts. Mr. Abouammo never waived prosecution by indictment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b). Four months after the limitations period had expired, the government dismissed this placeholder information and replaced it with a superseding indictment containing the same charges. The questions presented are: 1. Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute's intent element "contemplates" effects that could occur there. 2. Whether a criminal information unaccompanied by a waiver of indictment is an "information charging a felony" that allows the government to unilaterally extend the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3288. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-10348

Noem, Sec. of Homeland v. Al Otro Lado | 03/24/26 | Docket #: 25-5 25-5 NOEM V. AL OTRO LADO DECISION BELOW: 138 F.4th 1102 CERT. GRANTED 11/17/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq . , provides that an alien who "arrives in the United States" may apply for asylum and must be inspected by an immigration officer. 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1225(a)(1) and (3). The question presented is whether an alien who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border "arrives in the United States" within the meaning of those provisions. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-55988, 22-56036

Watson v. RNC | 03/23/26 | Docket #: 24-1260 24-1260 WATSON V. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 200 CERT. GRANTED 11/10/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The federal election-day statutes-2 U.S.C. § 7, 2 U.S.C. § 1, and 3 U.S.C. § 1-set the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in certain years as the "election" day for federal offices. Like all other States, Mississippi requires that ballots for federal offices be cast-marked and submitted to election officials-by that day. And like most other States, Mississippi allows some of those timely cast ballots (mail-in absentee ballots, in Mississippi's case) to be counted if they are received by election officials a short time after election day (in Mississippi, within 5 business days after election day). Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15- 637(1)(a). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit held that the federal election-day statutes require that ballots be both cast by voters and received by election officials by election day and thus preempt Mississippi's law. The question presented is whether the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-60395

Hunter v. United States | 03/03/26 | Docket #: 24-1063 24-1063 HUNTER V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 5003582 CERT. GRANTED 10/10/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: This Court has recognized that "no appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims." Garza v. Idaho , 586 U.S. 232, 238 (2019). But the Court has "ma[de] no statement ... on what particular exceptions [to appeal waivers] may be required." Id . at 238-39 & n.6. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its precedent, holding that there are only two grounds on which defendants who sign general appeal waivers may challenge their sentence on appeal: (1) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) claims that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopt a similarly narrow view of the exceptions to general appeal waivers. In stark conflict, the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits permit defendants who sign general appeal waivers to raise a broad range of constitutional challenges to their sentences beyond the limited exceptions recognized by the Fifth Circuit and the other courts on its side of the circuit split. The Fifth Circuit below also reaffirmed its precedent holding that an appeal waiver applies even when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object to that advice. Although other circuits agree with the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit squarely holds otherwise, releasing defendants from appeal waivers in identical circumstances. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 2. Whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-20211

Pung v. Isabella County | 02/25/26 | Docket #: 25-95 25-95 PUNG V. ISABELLA COUNTY, MICHIGAN DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 318222 CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Isabella County confiscated the Pung Estate's private home for approximately $2,200 in taxes and fees (that were never actually owed). The lower courts used the artificially depressed auction sale price rather than the property's fair market value as the starting point for its damages calculation. The Sixth Circuit and others have held that the "fair market value" taken is not what is owed to begin to fulfill the constitutional compensatory obligation imposed by the Fifth Amendment. That defies this Court's precedents. And if it is not taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, it is otherwise an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment by imposing a punishment by pilfering far more than ever needed to satisfy a small debt. The questions presented are: 1. Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when the compensation is based on the artificially depressed auction sale price rather than the property's fair market value? 2. Whether the forfeiture of real property worth far more than needed to satisfy a tax debt but sold for fraction of its real value constitutes an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, particularly when the debt was never actually owed? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1919, 22-1939

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. | 02/23/26 | Docket #: 24-699 24-699 EXXON MOBIL CORP. V. CORPORACION CIMEX DECISION BELOW: 111 F.4th 12 CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: In 1960, the Cuban government confiscated the property of American nationals and transferred it to state-owned enterprises. After years without a diplomatic resolution, Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act, which created a damages action for American nationals against "any person ... that traffics in" such confiscated property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act defines "person" to include "any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," id. § 6023(11), and expressly contemplates "judgment[s] against an agency or instrumentality of the Cuban Government," id . § 6082(d). The question presented is: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that Act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020

Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook | 01/21/26 | Docket #: 25A312 25A312 TRUMP V. COOK DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2654786 THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE COURT IS DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT IN JANUARY 2026. JURISDICTION NOTED 10/1/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: