
Insights from recent episode analysis
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Insights are generated by CastFox AI using publicly available data, episode content, and proprietary models.
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Total monthly reach
Estimated from 28 chart positions in 28 markets.
By chart position
- 🇬🇧GB · Government#32100K to 300K
- 🇦🇺AU · Government#1285K to 30K
- 🇨🇦CA · Government#1535K to 30K
- 🇮🇳IN · Government#3730K to 100K
- 🇸🇪SE · Government#7810K to 30K
- Per-Episode Audience
Est. listeners per new episode within ~30 days
157K to 507K🎙 ~2x weekly·92 episodes·Last published 3w ago - Monthly Reach
Unique listeners across all episodes (30 days)
313K to 1.0M🇬🇧30%🇮🇸30%🇮🇳10%+25 more - Active Followers
Loyal subscribers who consistently listen
94K to 304K
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* Data sourced directly from platform APIs and aggregated hourly across all major podcast directories.
On the show
From 11 epsHost
Recent guests
Recent episodes
Land Power and contemporary conflict
Aug 10, 2026
Unknown duration
The DIP: It's not about national security
Jul 27, 2026
Unknown duration
Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Military: Society deserves better
May 17, 2026
40m 20s
How Resilient or Prepared is Enough?
Apr 15, 2026
32m 41s
Defending MDO
Mar 18, 2026
42m 31s
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| Date | Episode | Topics | Guests | Brands | Places | Keywords | Sponsor | Length | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8/10/26 | Land Power and contemporary conflict | The reticence of Western governments to use Land Forces on operations has been notable of late. Dr Jack Watling, from RUSI in London, talks through the reasons for this, the lessons from Ukraine (and whether these are different from lessons from other theatres), whether both the battlefield is transparent and if dispersion is helping, the strategies being employed by various belligerents, counter C2 warfare (with specific emphasis on the IDF experiences), logistics, the human requirement when technology becomes the driving force, and the reality of Ukrainian drone operations. What emerges from the discussion is that if you want assurance in reaching political goals when undertaking war, you must employ land forces – and you must have the scale to make them effective: doing it on the cheap or on a small scale (ie anything below Army Group) just won't cut it. | — | ||||||
| 7/27/26 | The DIP: It's not about national security | Despite all the diatribes written about the UK's 2026 Defence Investment Plan, the root of the issue wasn't identified; that the plan was about military hardware and not about the UK's National Security. Ewan Lawson talks about three aspects of the DIP that underline this. First, the UK's missile and air defence plans as an example of the military's attitude towards societal resilience and critical national infrastructure: Hybrid war is a Transition to War (in old money) and not a synonym for 'peace'. Second, the reality of cyber operations today; what has been learned from recent operations in terms of value-for-money (or not) that cyber provides as an exploitation or effect. Third, the worrying nature of the UK-US relationship (both militarily and politically) as it has degraded since 2001. The latter is vital for the UK's national security but it feels like there is a delusion in some areas that all is well, when patently it isn't. | — | ||||||
| 5/17/26 | parliamentary scrutinymilitary governance+3 | Mike Martin | Ministry of Defence | Tunbridge Wells | parliamentary committeesMinistry of Defence+3 | — | 40m 20s | ||
| 4/15/26 | national preparednessemergency planning+4 | — | UK's National Preparedness Commission | UKGermany+4 | preparednessnational emergencies+5 | — | 32m 41s | ||
| 3/18/26 | MDOUS Army doctrine+3 | Colonel (retired) Richard Creed | Combined Arms Doctrine DirectorateFort Leavenworth+3 | — | MDOUS Army+5 | — | 42m 31s | ||
| 2/18/26 | Multi Domain Operationsmilitary strategy+3 | — | MDO: It's a terrible concept | — | Multi Domain Operationsmilitary operations+3 | — | 40m 09s | ||
| 1/12/26 | Moscow's actionsEuropean security+4 | — | Moscow | PolandEstonia+9 | MoscowEurope+6 | — | 34m 20s | ||
| 12/3/25 | defense fundingmilitary infrastructure+4 | Robbie Boyd | DSR BankNATO | Europe | defense companiesfunding+7 | — | 1h 01m 15s | ||
| 11/3/25 | mountain warfarehigh ground+3 | — | Kurds | Kargil WarNagorno-Karabakh+3 | mountain warfarehigh ground+4 | — | 44m 56s | ||
| 10/2/25 | Artificial Intelligencebattlefield technology+3 | Rob Wilson | Artificial Intelligencecyber warfare | — | AIbattlefield+4 | — | 44m 15s | ||
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| 8/12/25 | civil-military relationspolitical authority+4 | Kori Schake | The State and The SoldierThe Soldier and The State | America | civil-military relationspolitical authority+5 | — | 41m 19s | ||
| 7/7/25 | military trainingnational security+4 | — | — | — | militarytraining+5 | — | 59m 25s | ||
| 6/9/25 | UK Strategic Defence Reviewmilitary analysis+3 | Paul Cornish | University Of Exeter's Centre for the Public Understanding of Defence and Security | UK | UK SDRmilitary+5 | — | 41m 43s | ||
| 5/12/25 | The Russian Meat Grinder | Given the way Russian military cheifs send their troops into combat without regard for rates of attrition and casualties, it seems to bamboozle many Western commentators that the Russian people are not rising up against their leaders. Why? Amelie Tolvin, a visiting scholar at the University of Helsinki's Aleksanteri Institute, provides some clear insight about why revolution is unlikely, but also why Russian troops fight in the way they do (war crimes and all). Over the past 3 years – since the start of Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine - various military leaders, diplomats, military chiefs and commentators have been at pains to tell us all that the Russian military is on the verge of collapsing. They have quoted figures of dead and injured from that conflict that seem almost impossible for a Western audience to accept. Indeed, the loss rate of people on the Russian front has been so high that people suggest there are no more men in Russian to recruit or conscript. Amelie provides some important corrective evidence that needs to be better understood. You can read Amelie's article in Foreign Policy Magazine here: https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/09/russia-soldiers-ukraine-war-crimes-meatgrinder-human-waves-brutal-violence-protest/ | — | ||||||
| 4/7/25 | Air combat power vs IAMD | After more than 3 years of war in Ukraine, the Russian military is not a spent force: indeed, the combination of more flying hours for more aircrew, 3 years of combat experience in CAS, AI, CAP, Strike and ISR missions, a war economy supporting new airframes and weapons, and low pilot attrition rates has made the Russian Air Force capable of what it was supposed to do in 2022 – and then some. It now has the ability to outmatch European NATO states in capability, experience and fighting power for the next decade. Professor Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow for Air Power at RUSI in London, explains why a wholesale shift to drones isn't going to be the ubiquitous answer that the speeches from military and political leaders make out. As the IAMD system in NATO states matures (albeit at differing speeds), the Russian system is also a major factor in air power planning for the future. The impact on how NATO wants to fight, and how it will have to fight, is stark. And it's not going to be good enough to continue copying the US model: for the USAF and USN, the Pacific is requiring a drive towards a different force design, way of operating, C2, and basing options from those that would work for NATO in Europe. Context matters. | — | ||||||
| 3/17/25 | SDR Threat series: How to deter Russia? | The West has not deterred Russia from destabilising Europe, the Caucasus, North and Sub Saharan Africa, or the Middle East. Moscow has undertaken war-like activity in NATO states since the 1990s: from assassination, subterfuge and sabotage to attacks on critical national infrastructure, political interference and industrial espionage. Russian expert Keir Giles, a senior consulting fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House in London, explains what Russia wants, how the West misunderstands Russian societal desires, the Russian way of war, measures of success, and why economics and prosperity just aren't important to them. Keir finishes with a discussion on what it takes to deter Russia: this has been done before and could be done again. It just takes political will. Whether European leaders have that is a completely different question. | — | ||||||
| 3/11/25 | SDR Threat series: National Security without US guarantees | President Trump might have shocked some European leaders but the writing has been on the wall for decades: European states will have to take responsibility for their own security. Despite Russian aggression in Europe since Georgia (2008), and the promises made by NATO states in Wales 2014, there are only a few NATO states that can provide a degree of credible assurance on national security to their populations as the US withdraws. RUSI's Ed Arnold delves into the implications for national and regional security for individual states and multilateral bodies: from leadership and the consequences for NATO, to EU and EC funding mechanisms. Critically, the timeline for US withdrawal and European rearmament might not align: the resulting window when Russia could unpick the credibility of NATO arrives rapidly. | — | ||||||
| 2/21/25 | SDR Threat Series - Trust and Honesty | If the relationship between a government, the military, and industry is to really change from a transactional one towards a sincere partnership it must be underpinned by a new era of honesty and clarity. Simon Kings, Exec BD Director of Raytheon UK, talks about what has changed for industry since 2022, and what the threat picture looks like for the DIB. The discussion covers procurement and acquisition, processes and modernisation, challenges to delivery, and what the reality of 'sovereignty' as a political ambition statement looks like. Foundational to all of this is Simon's description of the way industry (and shareholders) make investment decisions: yet another set of political speeches and promises, policies and transformations, doesn't cut it. Clarity about which bits of national security are not going to be funded are as important as the revelations of what is to be renewed. That honesty and clarity seems to have been missing for several decades. Will this be the moment it changes? | — | ||||||
| 1/29/25 | SDR Threat Series – The Politics of a Defence Review | The politics of a review of a national security strategy are huge. What is the appetite for change? What is the appetite to deliver? What is the political reference and timeframe for decisions? How to balance domestic pressures and foreign threats? Former UK Minister of the Armed Forces, military veteran, and ex-MP, The Rt Hon James Heappey talks about the tensions and challenges of putting national security on the political agenda, getting it funded, delivering change, and why it doesn't always work as planned. A fascinating insight into how politics at this level works, with all the implications on industry, society, voter, and banking. No mincing of words here. | — | ||||||
| 12/27/24 | SDR Threat series – Buying Silver Bullets | The continual changes to British defence acquisition and procurement processes, frameworks, doctrines, strategies and plans have wreaked havoc with the military equipment plan for decades. Various – and sometimes radical – reforms have been tried to evolve a system that is ubiquitously criticised from everyone inside (and outside) the national security community. No one is happy, yet most people actually involved in it are trying very hard to make it work. This is not a uniquely British problem however: There is nowhere in the world that people are content with their procurement system - each one could be faster, buy better kit, deliver imporved value-for-money and quality, pleasing taxpayers as well as the people who use the kit. Given that the on-going UK SDR must try and come up with some recommendations to make it 'better' (hopefully in a different way than every other one has promised to do since 1997), what are the opportunities and risks this time around? Dr Andrew Curtis helps us think thus through with some sage advice: how about starting by implementing all the bits of some previous attempts at reform? | — | ||||||
| 12/18/24 | SDR Threat series - Missile Defence (you can't defend everything) | Successive reports from the UK parliament since 2022 have highlight the inadequacies of air and missile defences in the UK against a growing threat envelope. Like many European states, missile defence – from UAVs, conventional, ballistic or hypersonic missiles – has been an area that successive governments have underinvested in. Events in Ukraine, Syria, Yemen and Israel make those points with rather startling clarity. Part of the remit that the UK SDR has been charged with is a 'so what' moment on missile defence. What would good look like? What would it cost? Are we (in the UK and other European states) starting from scratch or is there an existing baseline to build on? One of the global IAMD experts and gurus in such matters is Tom Karako from CSIS in Washington DC. His pragmatism on what can be delivered, what must be defended against, and success looks like is noteworthy. As a finale, Tom offers some metrics of success of any UK announcement of a missile defence capability for the UK that is announced over the coming year. | — | ||||||
| 12/11/24 | The Threat Landscape with Peter Frankopan | National security risk registers capture a large number of potential threats to societies. So should any review of national security or national defence. The impacts of these risks are often more severe than predicted, and we are due a few more (according to pattern analysis over the history of the planet). Professor Peter Frankopan, global best-selling author and world renowned historian, talks through some of the big issues that should be on the agenda of any threat-based national security review including food, health, fuel, water, and raw materials. The UK has a sound record of identifying these threats - even if successsive governments are poor at preparing for them. It is somewhat puzzling that any review of national security, like the one that the UK is currently undertaking, should be focused solely on military, geopolitical and technology risks and not those that might prove a much greater challenge to the safety and security of the state. | — | ||||||
| 12/4/24 | SDR Threat Series: Misunderstanding Adversaries and Inconvenient Threats | National security is an all-encompassing, cross-society endeavour: Any national security strategy must be that too, or it will miss critical elements and levers. In conversation with Maria de Goeij Reid from the Changing Character of War programme at Oxford University, the often-ignored aspects of resilience and economics within SDRs is brought starkly to the fore. By relying on convenient threats (ie those that have a military and foreign policy solution), policymakers, military and political leaders return to their comfortable intellectual spaces of known-knowns and simply reprioritise some policy and military capability: the result is a series of surprises (that have previously been predicted by other arms of government), for which the state is ill-prepared or not equipped to respond to. At the heart of all this lies an inability to understand adversaries, or our own decision-making. Maria makes a compelling case for putting more emphasis on strategic empathy using the lessons from advances in complexity economics. | — | ||||||
| 11/12/24 | SDR Threat Series: Weapons, Systems, and the promise of AI | Professor Tony King (author of "Command", "Urban Warfare", and "The Combat Soldier") talks through his understanding of how threats will develop over the coming years, not least of which will be another Trump presidency in the USA. Using Great Power Competition as a guide, Tony talks about warfare regimes that will accompany the proliferation of state sponsored proxies, about where national security challenges will emerge, and the inability of tradiotnal (declining?) powers to deal with them alone. New weapons, the importance of systems, and the complexity of decision-making all feature in an episode that culminates in a discussion on AI and War; the topic of Tony's recent research and his forthcoming book. His conclusions: we need to be more sceptical about what AI will deliver in terms of 'savings'. This mini-series is sponsored by Raytheon UK. | — | ||||||
| 11/3/24 | SDR Threats Series: Styles and Themes of Contemporary Warfare | As the nearly new UK government formulate a Strategic Defence Review (probably for publication after new US President takes office), this mini-series looks at the threats and how the UK might mitigate them. In this episode Professor Paul Cornish talks to Peter about the Styles and Themes of threats that the UK (like many Euopean states) face, and the need for strategic thinking not another strategy. Paul is depressingly clear about how successive British reviews of national security has become a "cottage industry of nonsense", replying on useless metrics, irrelevant images, and cliched catchphrases (global Britain, fusion doctrine, integrated, comprehensive, full-spectrum, sunrise/sunset, et al). In characterising the contemporary threats, Paul talks about similarities to the pre-Cold War era as distinct from the popular narratives towards a 'new Cold War'. The series will culminate in a Q+A session. Send your comments, puzzles and questions to [email protected]. | — | ||||||
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Chart history for This Means War
Peaked at #5 in IS, top 10 in 1 of 28 tracked markets, currently #5 in IS.
| Market | Genre | Peak | Current | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IS | — | #5 | #5 | — |
| United Kingdom | — | #32 | #32 | — |
| CZ | — | #37 | #37 | — |
| India | — | #37 | #37 | — |
| Norway | — | #51 | #51 | — |
| Denmark | — | #51 | #51 | — |
| TW | — | #55 | #55 | — |
| RO | — | #60 | #60 | — |
| TH | — | #63 | #63 | — |
| Finland | — | #65 | #65 | — |
| PL | — | #72 | #72 | — |
| Sweden | — | #78 | #78 | — |
| South Korea | — | #89 | #89 | — |
| SG | — | #90 | #90 | — |
| AT | — | #91 | #91 | — |
| Italy | — | #94 | #94 | — |
| New Zealand | — | #110 | #110 | — |
| BE | — | #115 | #115 | — |
| CH | — | #126 | #126 | — |
| Australia | — | #128 | #128 | — |
Chart Positions
28 placements across 28 markets.
Chart Positions
28 placements across 28 markets.