Walden Pod

Ralph Stefan Weir and Ben Watkins debate whether there is a sound argument from mental causation to materialism. Is the interaction problem for substance dualism fake or fatal? My interview with Dr. Weir on substance dualism: • You Are A Soul — w/ Ralph Stefan Weir Dr. Ralph Stefan Weir is the author of The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. He teaches philosophy at the University of Lincoln and is an Associate Member of the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Oxford. Ben Watkins is the co-host of the excellent philosophy of religion podcast, Real Atheology / @realatheology Linktree

Durham University hosted a conference about panpsychism, pantheism, and panentheism last November, and I was graciously given the opportunity to respond to Joanna Leidenhag and Tim Mulgan. Professor Leidenhag and Professor Mulgan both spoke about alternative models of theism, and I offered a few thoughts and objections to their respective models of God. On Durham's website, you can listen to all the full lectures from the event: https://sites.google.com/view/panpsychismandpanentheism/project-events/durham-workshop?authuser=0Linktree00:00 Emerson Green 15:40 Joanna Leidenhag 23:37 Tim Mulgan 31:00 Q&A

We explore Paul Draper's "psychological aether theory" or "aetherism". In addition to gravitation, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak interactions, there is a fifth fundamental interaction: A field of consciousness, a world-soul or mental aether that interacts with our brains. "How does the brain produce the mind? It doesn't. Instead, mentality exists quite independently of the brain." Draper's recent work on aetherism is a refinement of a view proposed by William James in his 1898 Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality. James doesn't deny that thought is a function of the brain. Rather, he challenges the assumption that the function in question is one of production. He defends what he calls the "transmissive function" view over the theory that thought is produced by the brain. For James, consciousness pre-exists, with our brain giving finite human shape to experience, like the pipes of an organ shape the trembling air as it escapes from the organ's air-chest. Aetherism can explain the tight correlation between mental and physical states while allowing for their conceptual and ontological distinction, and dispensing with the need for any spontaneous production of consciousness de novo by the brain. Both Draper and James recognize that aetherism leaves the door open to an afterlife, as well as certain psi phenomena. As Draper puts it, "perhaps William James was right to challenge the confidence that most philosophers and scientists have that there is no life after death. For if we don't know that aetherism is false, then we don't actually know that the subject of our psychological properties does not continue to exist after our bodies are destroyed.” William James - Human Immortality Paul Draper - Psychological Aether TheoryLinktree

We dive into the philosophy of personal identity, exploring whether a consistent "self" persists through time despite physical and mental changes. Is there an essential core that endures transformations? We examine the Ship of Theseus, the deadly and murderous teletransporter which murders people, the “no self” view associated with Hume, mind uploading, Ralph Stefan Weir’s dilemma for transhumanists, and whether Socrates could have been an alligator. Linktree

Ralph Stefan Weir joins me to discuss his book, The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. We talk about the myth of the interaction problem, the connection between theism and the soul, the implausibility of property dualism, substance dualism in Eastern thought, the causal closure argument and energy conservation, a posteriori necessities, modal rationalism, panpsychism and idealism, personal identity, transhumanism, mind-uploading, split brain cases, whether souls are eternal, and much else. Dustin Crummett's interview with Dr. Weir. . .For reference, here are the two arguments from the book we spent the most time on:DISEMBODIMENT ARGUMENT(i) The phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical.(ii) If the phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical, then they do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.(iii) Therefore, the phenomenal facts do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.PARITY ARGUMENT(i) If you accept the conceivability argument, you must accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument.(ii) If you accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.(iii) Therefore, if you accept the conceivability argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.. . .Linktree

Today, we explore the privacy of consciousness, a feature of the mind rejected by qualia antirealists. (summary of the arguments begins at 43:45) A few of the papers and books referenced: Is Mental Privacy Defensible? Jaffer AhmedExplaining Mental Privacy - Colin McGinnOther minds are neither seen nor inferred - Mason Westfall Understanding Knowledge - Michael HuemerIllusionism As A Theory of Consciousness Galileo's Error - Philip Goff Linktree

Today we discuss Mary the color scientist, her cousin Fred, and a colorblind Norwegian neuroscientist. Specifically, we talk about why Philip Goff thinks "phenomenal curiosity" threatens the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy, ruling out moderate forms of physicalism. Curiosity and the Knowledge Argument - Philip Goff Linktree

I give three reasons why panpsychism typically strikes us as counterintuitive, and why we shouldn't credit our innate bias against it. David Papineau: Physicalists who find panpsychism counterintuitive haven’t truly freed themselves from dualist thinking Jonathan Birch on overconfidence about sentience This episode was available early to supporters at patreon.com/waldenpodLinktree