Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Mullin v. Doe Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2026. Petitioner: Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security.Respondent: Dahlia Doe. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners) Ahilan T. Arulanantham (for the Respondents in Case No. 25-1083) Geoffrey M. Pipoly (for the Respondents in Case No. 25-1084) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program to allow foreign nationals from countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disasters, or other extraordinary conditions to live and work legally in the United States on a temporary basis. Federal law requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to periodically review conditions in each designated country and, after consulting with other government agencies, determine whether those conditions still justify protection. Syria has held TPS designation for years, shielding its nationals from deportation to a country ravaged by civil war and humanitarian crisis. Shortly after taking office in January 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14159, directing the Secretary to aggressively limit TPS designations. Secretary Kristi Noem then terminated TPS for Syria on September 19, 2025, with an effective date of November 21, 2025 — giving roughly 6,100 Syrian TPS holders weeks to lose their legal status, work authorization, and protection from deportation. Seven Syrian nationals with family ties in the United States sued, arguing that the termination violated federal immigration law, was arbitrary and capricious, and reflected discriminatory animus rather than a genuine, good-faith review of conditions in Syria. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion and postponed the termination effective November 19, 2025; the government appealed and moved to stay that order, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the stay on February 17, 2026, concluding that the government had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. Question Did the Trump administration lawfully end the Temporary Protected Status program for Syrian nationals?

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2026. Petitioner: Cisco Systems, Inc.Respondent: Doe I. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Paul L. Hoffman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a campaign of persecution—referred to as “douzheng”—against practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual discipline derived from Buddhism that grew rapidly in popularity across China. In 1999, the Party formally sought to eliminate Falun Gong through detention, forced conversion, and torture, designating it an illegal organization. To support these efforts, the Chinese authorities envisioned a nationwide surveillance system named the “Golden Shield,” designed to monitor online activity, identify practitioners, and facilitate their apprehension. Because China lacked the necessary technological infrastructure, Chinese officials sought help from Western firms. Cisco Systems, Inc., a U.S.-based tech company, allegedly responded with enthusiasm: from its headquarters in San Jose, California, Cisco pursued contracts, developed Golden Shield software and hardware, and provided training and support to Chinese security officers. Plaintiffs alleged that without Cisco’s technology—including advanced databases, real-time monitoring systems, and network optimization tools—Chinese authorities could not have effectively tracked, detained, or tortured Falun Gong adherents. Plaintiffs in this case include thirteen Chinese nationals and one U.S. citizen, Charles Lee, who claim they were targeted using Cisco’s technology and then detained, tortured, and subjected to psychological and physical abuse. Some plaintiffs reported multiple detentions and long-term surveillance; others described instances of torture facilitated by personalized information drawn from Golden Shield databases. Several allege that the abuses led to the deaths of family members. They contend that the design, development, and optimization of Cisco’s technology—and its tailored marketing to support Falun Gong persecution—enabled widespread human rights abuses undertaken by Chinese state and Party officials. The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2011, bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The district court dismissed all claims, finding them insufficiently connected to the United States and lacking the necessary legal support for aiding and abetting liability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that aiding and abetting liability is actionable under both the ATS and the TVPA and that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged Cisco’s knowing participation in a domestic context. Question Does either the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act allow a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting?

T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2026. Petitioner: T. M.Respondent: University of Maryland Medical System Corporation. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In March 2023, T.M., a woman with a rare medical condition that triggers psychosis upon consuming gluten, was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center after an episode. Her treating psychiatrist sought and received state approval to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication; T.M. contested this but was unsuccessful in administrative proceedings. Independent psychiatrists later stated that T.M. no longer required inpatient care. To secure her release, T.M. and the hospital negotiated an oral agreement, which was formalized as a state court consent order. The order allowed her to leave the hospital on the condition that she comply with ongoing psychiatric treatment and medications, switch providers, and drop pending lawsuits. Her parents, J.M. and A.M., were also bound to notify authorities if she failed to comply. Ten days later, represented by new counsel, T.M. and her parents filed the present federal lawsuit claiming that the consent order was unconstitutional and entered under duress. They challenged the order as violating T.M.’s due process rights and sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating its enforcement. They did not request damages or challenge the initial commitment decisions. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the lawsuit. It held that T.M.’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, because they amounted to a request for federal review of a state court judgment. It also dismissed the parents’ claims for failure to state a constitutional violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that T.M. was a “state-court loser” seeking to undo a state judgment still reviewable in Maryland courts. Nonetheless, it remanded for the district court to modify T.M.’s dismissal to be without prejudice, due to lack of jurisdiction. Question Can the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court?

Pitchford v. Cain Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2026. Petitioner: Terry Pitchford.Respondent: Burl Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections. Advocates: Joseph J. Perkovich (for the Petitioner) Scott G. Stewart (for the Respondents) Emily M. Ferguson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Terry Pitchford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 2004 armed robbery and killing of Reuben Britt, a store owner in Grenada County, Mississippi. At the time of the crime, Pitchford was 18 years old. He confessed to participating in the robbery, although the fatal shot was fired by his accomplice. At Pitchford’s 2006 trial in the Grenada County Circuit Court, the jury was selected from a pool that included 36 white and five Black potential jurors. The prosecution used peremptory strikes to remove four of the five Black prospective jurors. Pitchford’s counsel raised a Batson objection, alleging that the strikes were racially discriminatory. The trial court found Pitchford had made a prima facie showing of discrimination and required the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for each strike. The prosecutor cited explanations such as the venirepersons’ criminal histories, perceived mental health issues, or similarities to the defendant. The trial judge accepted those explanations and allowed the strikes, ultimately empaneling a jury that included only one Black juror. Pitchford’s counsel sought to preserve Batson-related objections during a bench conference, emphasizing the racial composition of the jury and the county, but did not conduct a further comparative analysis or expressly argue that the prosecution’s stated reasons were pretextual. Pitchford’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Mississippi Supreme Court, which held that any pretext arguments had been waived for failure to raise them clearly at trial. A federal district court later granted habeas relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling the Mississippi Supreme Court had reasonably applied Batson and its waiver rule. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably determined, under AEDPA, that Pitchford waived his right to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral justifications for the challenged juror strikes. Question Did the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably decide—under the standards set by federal habeas law—that Terry Pitchford gave up his right to argue that the prosecutor’s explanations for striking four Black jurors were false or racially biased?

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2026. Petitioner: Adrian Jules.Respondent: Andre Balazs Properties. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Daniel L. Geyser (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont hotel in Los Angeles until he was fired in March 2020. In December 2020, he sued multiple individuals and affiliated corporate entities in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging discrimination and other claims under both federal and state law. He invoked federal-question jurisdiction under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jules signed with Chateau Marmont, which was not initially named as a party. The district court stayed the litigation pending arbitration but did not formally compel arbitration, as the agreement required arbitration to occur in California, outside that court’s district. Jules proceeded to arbitrate his claims against Chateau alone. The arbitrator ultimately ruled against him on all claims and sanctioned him and his attorney for misconduct during the arbitration. After the award, Jules returned to the district court, seeking to vacate it, while Chateau and other defendants sought to confirm it—even though some of them were not parties to the arbitration proceeding. Jules argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow v. Walters, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm the award because the post-arbitration petitions, on their face, did not establish federal jurisdiction. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the award, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that because the court had jurisdiction over the original, stayed lawsuit, it retained jurisdiction over subsequent applications to confirm or vacate the arbitration award. That ruling deepened a split among the courts of appeals, prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Question Does a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintain jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking?

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Thomas Keathley.Respondent: Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) William M. Jay (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Thomas Keathley filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in December 2019. In August 2021, while his bankruptcy case was ongoing, Keathley was in a motor vehicle collision with David Fowler, a truck driver employed by Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (BAC). Keathley hired a personal injury attorney the next day and subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against BAC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in December 2021, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. Keathley, however, failed to disclose this new personal injury lawsuit as a potential asset to the bankruptcy court. He submitted multiple amended bankruptcy plans in March 2022 and June 2022, none of which mentioned the pending lawsuit. The bankruptcy court confirmed Keathley’s modified plan in July 2022, unaware of the personal injury claim. Keathley only amended his bankruptcy schedule to include the lawsuit after BAC moved to dismiss the personal injury case. BAC moved for summary judgment in the personal injury suit, arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Keathley’s claim because he failed to disclose it during his bankruptcy proceeding. The district court granted BAC’s motion, dismissing the lawsuit, and subsequently denied Keathley's motion for reconsideration. Keathley then appealed both of those decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decisions. Question May the doctrine of judicial estoppel be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith?

Watson v. Republican National Committee Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2026. Petitioner: Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State.Respondent: Republican National Committee, et al. Advocates: Scott G. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Federal statutes designate the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the uniform day for electing members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. While Mississippi requires voters to cast absentee ballots by this federal deadline, the state legislature amended its election code in 2020 to permit the counting of mail-in ballots received up to five business days after Election Day, provided they are postmarked by that Tuesday. This “postmark rule” allows validly cast votes delayed by mail service to be included in the final tally, a practice currently utilized by approximately thirty states. In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, and individual voters filed suit against Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson and county election officials. The plaintiffs argued that the federal statutes establishing a singular “election” day preempt Mississippi’s five-day receipt window, contending that an election is not legally concluded until officials actually receive the ballots. They sought to invalidate the state statute and enjoin officials from counting any absentee ballots received after federal Election Day. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, ruling that the state law did not conflict with federal statutes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that federal law preempts the Mississippi statute because ballots must be both cast and received by Election Day. Question Do the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day?

Hunter v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2026. Petitioner: Munson P. Hunter.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Munson P. Hunter, III pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud affecting a financial institution and to aiding and abetting. A federal district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. A specific condition of that supervised release requires Hunter to take any mental health medication prescribed by his physician. Hunter challenged his sentence at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing the medication condition infringed on his due process liberty interests and that the written judgment improperly included the “aiding and abetting” reference. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding the medication condition, finding it was barred by an appeal waiver in Hunter's plea agreement, and affirmed the judgment, noting that the “aiding and abetting” charge was indeed part of the count to which Hunter pleaded guilty. Question 1. Does an appeal waiver bar all claims except for ineffective assistance of counsel or a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum? 2. Does such a waiver become ineffective if the sentencing judge later tells the defendant they can appeal, and the government fails to object?