About this episode

Bruce examines the relationship between critical rationalism and the non-aggression principle, questioning the interpretation of coercion and its moral implications.

Bruce examines how effectively critical rationalism can ground the non-aggression principle (NAP)—the libertarian idea that, in some formulation, it is morally wrong to initiate violence. But does it really make sense to interpret all areas of law through this single principle? Might it be better replaced by an alternative, such as a principle of least coercion? And what, from a critical rationalist perspective, does coercion actually mean? Is it a theory with substantial moral content, or an easy-to-vary principle that ultimately collapses into “coercion is whatever I dislike”? And how might we test between these alternating views? Bonus: What did Karl Popper think of Thomas Szasz's theories? ⁠⁠⁠⁠Support us on Patreon⁠⁠⁠⁠

People in this episode

Hosts: Bruce Nielson, Peter Johansen

Topics covered

• critical rationalism
• non-aggression principle
• coercion
• libertarianism
• morality
• law

Mentioned in this episode

Organizations: Patreon

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