The High Court Report

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Case No. 25-6 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 3/24/2026 | Decided: 6/11/2026Overview: A bankruptcy debtor's failure to disclose a personal-injury lawsuit triggered the Fifth Circuit's rigid two-factor estoppel test, splitting federal circuits over whether courts must examine all circumstances or presume bad faith from knowledge and motive alone.Question Presented: Whether courts must examine the totality of circumstances — not just two factors — to determine if a bankruptcy debtor's omission of a lawsuit qualifies as inadvertent.Posture: District court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's personal-injury lawsuit under rigid two-factor judicial estoppel rule.Main Arguments:Petitioner Keathley: (1) Courts must examine all circumstances before concluding a bankruptcy omission reflects intentional concealment; (2) The Fifth Circuit's test conflates theoretical motive with actual bad faith, eliminating any real inadvertence exception; (3) Blocking honest debtors' lawsuits rewards tortfeasors and destroys assets creditors could recover.Respondent Buddy Ayers Construction: (1) Objective inconsistency — not subjective bad intent — supplies the basis for judicial estoppel; (2) The inadvertence exception covers only objectively verifiable errors, not every non-malicious explanation a debtor offers; (3) A multi-factor holistic test eliminates deterrence, invites abuse, and guts the bankruptcy disclosure system.Holding: Courts must examine the totality of circumstances surrounding a debtor's bankruptcy omission to determine whether that omission qualifies as inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of judicial estoppel; the Fifth Circuit erred by artificially restricting its inquiry to only two factors.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Vacated and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Judicial estoppel functions as an equitable doctrine, and equity demands case-by-case flexibility — not a mechanical two-factor checklist that blocks courts from considering all available evidence;(2) The Fifth Circuit's test fails both as too rigid — barring courts from looking beyond two factors — and too broad — those two factors apply to virtually every bankruptcy omission, making the exception meaningless;(3) Courts must weigh all circumstances — including prompt correction, absence of actual benefit, counsel's knowledge, and local bankruptcy practice — to determine whether an omission truly resulted from inadvertence.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring, joined by Gorsuch): Joins majority in full but questions whether federal courts hold any authority to apply judicial estoppel at all; the doctrine lacks statutory, procedural, or founding-era support and merits reexamination in a future case.Justice Sotomayor (concurring): Agrees with majority but argues judicial estoppel may never appropriately apply during open bankruptcy proceedings — bankruptcy courts already hold targeted remedies that serve the doctrine's goals without destroying debtors' claims.Implications:(1) Debtors who forget to disclose post-petition claims now receive a full-facts review before courts bar their lawsuits;(2) Personal-injury defendants lose the automatic kill switch that a bankruptcy filing once supplied in Fifth and Tenth Circuit courts;(3) Thomas and Gorsuch's concurrence opens the door to a future challenge to judicial estoppel's existence in federal courts entirely.The Fine Print:11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1): "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement" of the bankruptcy case, including pending and unliquidated claims against third parties.Official Form 106A/B, Schedule A/B: Property, Pt. 4, Question 33: Debtors must disclose "[c]laims against third parties, whether or not [the debtor] ha[s] filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment."Primary Cases:New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Established the modern federal framework for judicial estoppel and left open whether inadvertence or mistake may block the doctrine's application.Holmberg v. Armbrecht (1946): Confirmed that equitable doctrines "eschew mechanical rules" and depend on flexibility, requiring case-by-case analysis rather than rigid checklists.

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 04/29/2026 | Decided: 06/04/2026Overview: Amarin's cardiovascular drug patent faced challenge when generic maker Hikma launched a skinny-label version and marketed it through statements Amarin claimed encouraged doctors to prescribe the generic for the still-patented heart indication.Question Presented: Whether a generic drug maker's marketing statements plausibly constitute "active steps" inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b).Posture: District Court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Hikma):(1) Statements fully consistent with lawful skinny-label marketing cannot constitute active inducement under §271(b);(2) Federal law mandated the label's contents, making legal compliance an obvious alternative explanation that forecloses liability;(3) The Federal Circuit's physician-reading standard would destroy the Hatch-Waxman section viii pathway and expose generics to devastating litigation risk.Respondent (Amarin):(1) Hikma's totality of statements — repeatedly invoking "generic Vascepa," using an overbroad therapeutic category, and touting Vascepa's billion-dollar sales — plausibly encouraged infringing use;(2) Amarin spent $300 million discovering the cardiovascular indication and patent law must protect that investment from free-riders;(3) Seven other generic manufacturers avoided liability by accurately describing only their narrow approved uses, demonstrating Hikma's conduct fell outside normal practice.Holding: Amarin failed to state a claim for active inducement in violation of §271(b); none of Hikma's alleged statements — individually or in totality — plausibly constituted active steps encouraging infringement of Amarin's cardiovascular-use patents.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No Justice filed a separate opinion. Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Active inducement requires affirmative steps to encourage infringement — not merely statements physicians could read as instructions to infringe;(2) Hikma's label reflected legal compliance under the duty of sameness, its "generic Vascepa" description reflected standard industry practice, and omissions alone cannot support active inducement;(3) Website category descriptions, patient leaflet warnings, and investor press release sales figures lacked the clear, affirmative message inducement demands.Separate Opinions: None. The decision was unanimous.Implications:(1) Generic manufacturers may use the Hatch-Waxman skinny-label pathway without automatic inducement liability for routine commercial communications;(2) Brand manufacturers must plead specific affirmative acts of encouragement — not inferences drawn from vague statements or omissions;(3) The active inducement framework now applies with fresh clarity across all patent-holding industries.The Fine Print:35 U.S.C. §271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(v): Requires a generic drug application to contain "information to show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the [reference] listed drug . . . except for changes required because of differences approved under [applicable regulations]."Primary Cases:Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Active inducement requires purposeful, culpable expression and conduct designed to stimulate infringement; distributing a product capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses does not, alone, impose liability.Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007): A complaint must plead facts supporting a plausible claim for relief; allegations carrying obvious alternative lawful explanations fail to clear the plausibility bar.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (Hikma): Charles B. Klein of Winston & Strawn LLPAmicus Curiae (United States): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of JusticeRespondents (Amarin Pharma): Michael R. Huston of Perkins Coie LLP

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026Overview: The Supreme Court resolves a circuit split over whether the SEC must prove investors lost money before ordering disgorgement — preserving billions in annual securities enforcement power.Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.Main Arguments:Sripetch: (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's disgorgement definition, requiring restoration of funds to actual victims; (3) SEC's reading creates statutory anomalies and lets the agency circumvent jury-trial and procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.SEC: (1) Disgorgement targets the wrongdoer's gain, not the victim's loss — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 statute, eliminating any pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) "Unjust enrichment" in the 2021 text carries a common-law meaning that never required proof of monetary loss.Holding: The SEC may obtain a disgorgement award without proving investors suffered pecuniary loss. Traditional equitable principles tie the remedy to the defendant's wrongful gain from invading legally protected interests — not to any documented financial loss by the victim. Ninth Circuit affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Ninth Circuit affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Traditional equitable principles — confirmed across centuries of case law and the Restatements — measure disgorgement by the defendant's wrongful gain, not the victim's financial loss; no pecuniary harm requirement ever existed in equity;(2) Liu's "for victims" requirement drew from traditional equitable principles; those principles define a victim as someone whose legally protected interests the wrongdoer invaded, not someone who documented a financial loss;(3) When a defendant enriched himself without leaving the plaintiff financially worse off, equity prefers stripping the wrongdoer of unjust gains over allowing him to benefit from misconduct.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring): Agreed with the outcome but argued Congress's 2021 amendments transformed disgorgement into a legal remedy; urged the Court to recognize, in a future case, that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial for SEC disgorgement actions.Implications:(1) The SEC's multi-billion-dollar disgorgement toolkit survives intact — fraudsters cannot escape profit-stripping by structuring schemes so victims lose no documentable money;(2) The "nobody lost money" defense no longer shields securities violators from disgorgement;(3) Justice Thomas's concurrence invites a future Seventh Amendment jury-trial challenge to SEC disgorgement under the 2021 statute.The Fine Print:15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."Primary Cases:Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must go "for victims" — the foundational ruling this decision extended.SEC v. Govil (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit required proof of investor pecuniary harm before disgorgement, creating the circuit conflict the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (Sripetch): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone LLPRespondents (SEC): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice

FCC v. AT&T, Inc. / Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and Here | Argued: April 21, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026Overview: The FCC fined AT&T $57.3 million and Verizon $46.9 million for mishandling customer location data through in-house proceedings offering no jury — raising the question whether those proceedings violated the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in civil suits at common law.Question Presented: Whether the FCC's administrative forfeiture process violates the Seventh Amendment by imposing civil monetary penalties on regulated carriers without guaranteeing a jury trial.Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second Circuit upheld Verizon's. Court consolidated and granted cert.Main Arguments:FCC/United States (Petitioner): (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — carriers may lawfully decline to pay; (2) the Seventh Amendment right attaches at the Section 504 collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial; (3) Meeker and Hof already upheld this model — a preliminary nonbinding agency determination followed by a jury trial satisfies the Constitution.AT&T and Verizon (Respondents/Carriers): (1) The FCC's orders deploy mandatory statutory language — "determine," "assess," and "impose" — creating a binding present obligation to pay; (2) the back-end Section 504 jury option offers no real path, as no carrier received a jury trial in forty-seven years under this scheme; (3) the scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury rights on defying a nine-figure federal order.Holding: Because forfeiture orders issued under §503(b)(4) do not definitively resolve the parties' legal obligations, and the FCC's factual findings in its forfeiture proceedings are not conclusive, it does not violate the Seventh Amendment for the Commission to issue forfeiture orders without the involvement of a jury.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. No. 25-406 (Fifth Circuit): reversed and remanded. No. 25-567 (Second Circuit): affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) FCC forfeiture orders create no legally enforceable payment obligation — the agency holds no seizure power, interest does not accrue, and Section 504(c) bars the Commission from using unresolved orders against regulated parties; (2) Section 504(a)'s "trial de novo" requirement renders the Commission's factual findings legally void in any enforcement action — the jury starts from scratch; (3) unlike the SEC in Jarkesy, the FCC holds no administrative collection tools, so a jury makes the ultimate factual determination before the government can collect a dollar.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (Dissenting): Thomas agreed the orders carried no binding force and the carriers deserved de novo jury trials — but dissented because the majority granted no relief to carriers who paid in good faith reliance on orders commanding payment within thirty days.Implications: (1) Regulated carriers may now decline FCC forfeitures without accruing interest or penalties — DOJ must file collection suits within five years or the forfeiture evaporates; (2) AT&T and Verizon's combined hundred-million-dollar refund claims remain unresolved and available for future litigation; (3) agencies without immediate collection tools — unlike the SEC — likely survive Seventh Amendment scrutiny today.The Fine Print:U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be...recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States....any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."Primary Cases:SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment bars the SEC from imposing civil penalties through in-house proceedings where those penalties carry immediate enforceability and no de novo jury review of the underlying violation.Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue nonbinding monetary determinations — enforceable only in subsequent jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.): Jeffrey B. Wall of Sullivan & Cromwell LLPRespondents (FCC): Vivek Suri of the Department of Justice

Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Case No. 24-935 | Argued: 3/25/26 | Decided: May 28, 2026 | Docket Link: HereOverview: The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that last-mile delivery workers who never cross state lines still qualify for the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption from mandatory arbitration if their intrastate routes form part of a continuous interstate journey.Question Presented: Whether a worker qualifies for the FAA's Section 1 arbitration exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with interstate vehicles.Posture: District court denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert.Main Arguments:Flowers Foods (Petitioner): (1) Section 1 requires workers to cross state lines or interact with interstate vehicles; (2) Brock's purely intrastate route falls outside Congress's intended scope of the exemption; (3) Extending Section 1 to intrastate-only workers produces an unworkable, open-ended standard.Brock (Respondent): (1) Statutory text "engaged in interstate commerce" covers workers on intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys; (2) Historical Commerce Clause precedent confirms intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce; (3) The Court's own precedent in Saxon already rejected a crossing-state-lines requirement.Holding: The Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption from compelled arbitration for workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce,” 9 U. S. C. §1, can apply to a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey and who does not cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. No concurrences. No dissents. Tenth Circuit judgment affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) The 1925-era plain meaning of "engaged in interstate commerce" encompasses intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys — nothing in the text requires crossing state lines or tagging interstate vehicles; (2) The Daniel Ball (1871) and a line of Commerce Clause cases confirm that purely intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce when moving goods within a continuous multi-state shipment; (3) Flowers Foods waived alternative arguments — including independent-contractor status and title transfer — by staking its entire case on the rejected cross-or-tag rule.Separate Opinions: None.Implications: Last-mile delivery drivers, food distributors, and local couriers whose routes remain within a single state now hold stronger claims to Section 1 protection — blocking companies from compelling arbitration and reopening access to class action litigation. Companies relying on arbitration clauses in franchisee and distributor agreements face exposure on wage claims. Two questions remain open: whether Section 1 covers workers operating through independently owned business entities, and whether taking title to goods defeats the exemption — issues currently splitting the circuits.The Fine Print:Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933) defining "interstate commerce": "[t]raffic, intercourse, or the transportation of persons or property between or among the several states of the Union, or from or between points in one state and points in another state"Primary Cases:Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): An airline cargo loader who never flew or crossed state lines still qualified as a transportation worker "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871): A steamer operating entirely within Michigan still "engaged in commerce between the States" because it transported goods destined for or arriving from other states — multiple intrastate actors can collectively form one interstate transaction.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Flowers Food): Traci L. Lovett of Jones DayFor Respondent (Brock): Jennifer Bennett of Gupta Wessler

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Argued: 3/31/26 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: A Mississippi prosecutor struck four of five eligible Black jurors at a death penalty trial, a trial court skipped the required third step of the racial-discrimination inquiry, and the Mississippi Supreme Court then called it a waiver. The Supreme Court reverses.Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.Main Arguments:Pitchford (Petitioner): (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right; (2) The trial court blocked step three, making waiver impossible; (3) AEDPA deference does not shield an unreasonable factual determination that contradicts the trial record.Mississippi (Respondent): (1) Mississippi's long-standing preservation rule requires defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own trial attorney swore under oath she never preserved the pretext argument; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question, not the underlying Batson merits or form of relief.Holding: In Pitchford’s direct appeal of a capital murder sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established precedents of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, to determine that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett. Reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) The trial court ended its Batson analysis at step two — it declared the prosecutor's reasons race-neutral and pivoted without giving defense counsel any opportunity to challenge them as pretextual;(2) Pitchford did not waive step three because the trial court affirmatively assured defense counsel that the Batson objection already sat on the record;(3) AEDPA deference does not mean abdication — the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver ruling amounted to an unreasonable application of Batson precedents and an unreasonable factual determination.Separate Opinions:Justice Gorsuch (dissenting, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Barrett): Mississippi exercised its lawful authority under Ford v. Georgia to craft preservation rules; defense counsel never made a step-three comparative juror argument; the record does not compel Pitchford's reading under § 2254(d)(2)'s demanding standard; both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit read the record reasonably.Implications:Pitchford's case heads back to lower courts for the first full step-three Batson examination in over twenty years. Other death row defendants who faced similar procedural breakdowns — trial court skipped step three, state appellate court called it a waiver — gain a stronger federal habeas argument.Trial judges across the country receive a clear signal: Batson enforcement falls first on them, and shortcuts at step three carry constitutional consequences.The Fine Print:28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication...resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."Primary Cases:Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's full history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials before the Court reversed.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips BlackRespondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor GeneralUnited States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Fernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: A federal prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence sought early release by arguing potential innocence — but the Supreme Court closed that door, ruling compassionate release cannot substitute for the strict habeas process Congress designed.Question Presented: Whether a federal prisoner may use the compassionate release statute to challenge the validity of his conviction when habeas corpus procedures remain unavailable.Posture: Second Circuit reversed compassionate release grant; seven-two circuit split prompted cert.Main Arguments:Fernandez (Petitioner):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling reasons" contains no categorical exclusions barring conviction-related evidence;(2) Congress's explicit rehabilitation exclusion implies no other categorical limits exist;(3) Section 3582 and Section 2255 offer distinct remedies — reduction versus vacatur — and neither forecloses the other.United States (Respondent):(1) Claims challenging conviction validity must travel through Section 2255's reticulated habeas framework, not compassionate release;(2) Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — age, illness, family — not legal-error correction;(3) Permitting conviction challenges under Section 3582 would let prisoners circumvent Section 2255's strict procedural requirements indefinitely.Holding: A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Second Circuit affirmed. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Under Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973) and Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005), courts must read Section 3582 in harmony with Section 2255 — claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the habeas statute, not around it;(2) The statute's title, structure, Bureau of Prisons gatekeeping role, and decades of Sentencing Commission guidance confirm Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — not legal-error correction;(3) The mismatch between Fernandez's argument (conviction unsound) and his requested remedy (sentence reduction) confirms Section 3582 cannot carry conviction challenges.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment only, joined by Kagan): Agreed reversal warranted, but rejected the majority's habeas-based rule as atextual and overbroad. Proposed a narrower ground: compassionate release requires post-sentencing changed circumstances, not re-litigation of arguments courts previously considered.Justice Jackson (dissenting): The majority grafted an atextual habeas-based limitation onto Section 3582's broad "extraordinary and compelling" language — a rule Congress never wrote, never signaled, and the statute's text and history cannot support. Would vacate and remand for the Second Circuit to evaluate the district court's finding without a categorical bar.Implications: Federal prisoners who exhaust or lose under Section 2255 no longer hold compassionate release as an alternative path to raise conviction-related arguments. Courts must now distinguish "personal circumstances" claims (permissible under Section 3582) from "conviction-challenge" claims (channeled exclusively to Section 2255) — a line the majority left imprecisely drawn. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence signals the Court may remain open to post-sentencing new evidence of innocence under a changed-circumstances framework. The Court left unresolved whether freestanding actual innocence claims can succeed under Section 2255.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."28 U.S.C. § 2255(a): "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."Primary Cases:Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973): Claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the specific habeas statute — not broader civil statutes — or they impermissibly circumvent Congress's design.Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005): Prisoners may not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to re-argue denied habeas claims on the merits, as doing so circumvents the strict statutory limits on successive habeas petitions.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Fernandez): Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N.Y.For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Date Decided: 5/28/26 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here)Overview: Two prisoners serving decades-long gun-crime sentences sought early release after Congress reduced those sentences for future offenders but deliberately left them behind. The Court resolved whether that deliberate legislative gap qualified as a reason for compassionate release.Question Presented: Whether a sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive change to mandatory gun-crime penalties qualifies as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for compassionate release.Posture: Third Circuit affirmed denial of compassionate release in both cases; Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed.Main Arguments:Rutherford & Carter (Petitioners):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" invites a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry that permits courts to consider nonretroactive sentencing changes alongside other factors;(2) Congress's silence — beyond banning rehabilitation alone — left courts free to consider all other relevant information, including sentencing disparities;(3) The Sentencing Commission exercised valid delegated authority when it authorized courts to consider unusually long sentences and gross disparities.United States (Respondent):(1) Nonretroactive sentencing changes represent ordinary congressional practice, not extraordinary circumstances warranting judicial override;(2) Permitting courts to treat such changes as compelling reasons would undermine Congress's deliberate choice to leave prior sentences intact;(3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement exceeded its statutory authority by conflicting with the governing statute's plain meaning.Holding: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).Voting Breakdown: 6–3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Third Circuit judgments affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" requires reasons that are especially unusual and convincing — nonretroactive sentencing changes represent the norm, not an exception, making them neither extraordinary nor compelling;(2) Courts must clear a threshold gatekeeping requirement — extraordinary and compelling eligibility — before broad sentencing discretion applies;(3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy statement conflicted with the statute and fell as invalid.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson): Congress expressly delegated authority to the Sentencing Commission to define "extraordinary and compelling." The Commission acted reasonably within that delegation; the majority improperly substituted its own statutory reading for the Commission's judgment and conjured categorical limits that neither Congress nor the Commission imposed.Implications: Thousands of federal prisoners serving pre–First Step Act stacked gun-crime sentences now face a closed door on compassionate release arguments based on the sentencing gap Congress created in 2018. The ruling also strikes down the Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy category, removing it from district courts nationwide. The Court left open the precise outer boundaries of "extraordinary and compelling" and signaled that only Congress — through retroactivity legislation or a new relief mechanism — can deliver the remedy these prisoners sought. Future litigation will test the Commission's remaining authority and what post-sentencing legal developments beyond personal circumstances can clear the extraordinary-and-compelling bar.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court…may reduce the term of imprisonment…after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that…extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction…and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."28 U.S.C. § 994(t): "The Commission…shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples. Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason."Primary Cases:Concepcion v. United States (2022): Courts enjoy broad discretion to consider all relevant information when modifying sentences under provisions lacking limiting language — but eligibility for relief must first satisfy any gatekeeping requirement the statute imposes.Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024): When Congress expressly delegates authority to an agency to give meaning to a statutory term, courts must ensure the agency acts within reasonable bounds of that delegation rather than substituting their own interpretation.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Rutherford): David Frederick, Washington, D.C.For Petitioner (Carter): David O'Neil, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872 | Decided: May 21, 2026 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Death penalty case examining how courts evaluate multiple IQ scores when determining intellectual disability under Atkins. Court dismissed writ as improvidently granted after oral argument revealed parties never litigated the question below.Question Presented: Whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in assessing Atkins claims.Posture: Eleventh Circuit affirmed District Court finding Smith intellectually disabled using holistic approach.Main Arguments:Alabama (Petitioner): (1) Courts must combine multiple IQ scores using statistical methods to determine whether defendant proves IQ of 70 or below by preponderance; (2) Standard error of measurement applies equally in both directions, preventing reliance solely on lowest score's error range; (3) Holistic approaches that consider adaptive functioning alongside IQ scores improperly expand Atkins protection beyond intellectual functioning threshold.Smith (Respondent): (1) Courts must assess multiple scores holistically, considering measurement error, expert testimony, and other evidence of intellectual functioning together; (2) Hall requires courts to account for standard error when scores fall near the threshold; (3) Professional standards recommend clinical judgment considering all available evidence rather than mechanical statistical formulas.Holding: Per curiam opinion dismissed writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice Sotomayor wrote concurring opinion joined by Justice Jackson. Justice Thomas dissented. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justice Thomas, with Justice Gorsuch joining Parts I–III. No substantive ruling on merits.Majority Reasoning: Per curiam provided no reasoning. Two sentences: "The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered." Dismissal leaves Eleventh Circuit decision protecting Smith from execution intact without Supreme Court guidance on evaluating multiple IQ scores.Opinion: HereSeparate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Jackson): Case presented poor vehicle because parties never litigated proposed methodologies below; Alabama's own expert used holistic approach Alabama now attacks; no state follows Alabama's proposed rule.Justice Thomas (dissenting): Would overrule Atkins entirely as improper judicial lawmaking lacking foundation in Eighth Amendment text or original understanding.Justice Alito (dissenting, joined by Thomas, with Gorsuch joining Parts I–III): Court should have provided guidance on recurring question; lower courts need direction on evaluating multiple scores; dismissal exacerbates confusion in Atkins doctrine.Implications: Smith remains protected from execution. Courts nationwide lack Supreme Court guidance on multiple IQ scores beyond Hall and Moore principles. Holistic approach validated below remains permissible. Deep division among Justices signals potential vulnerability in Atkins doctrine. Defense attorneys gain validation for flexible methodologies; prosecutors cannot rely on rigid numerical cutoffs.The Fine Print:Eighth Amendment: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."Alabama Intellectual Disability Standard (Ex parte Perkins, 2002): Defendant must prove by preponderance: "(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 70 or below); (2) significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior; (3) manifestation during the developmental period (before age 18)."Primary Cases:Atkins v. Virginia (2002): Eighth Amendment categorically bars executing intellectually disabled individuals; states develop appropriate enforcement standards while Supreme Court establishes constitutional floors.Hall v. Florida (2014): Courts must consider standard error of measurement when evaluating IQ scores near 70 threshold; rigid cutoffs ignoring measurement error violate Eighth Amendment protections.

I'll create show notes and five alternative episode title options for this opinion episode.Now I'll create the show notes and title options for the M & K Employee Solutions opinion episode.PART 1: SHOW NOTESM & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Decided May 21, 2026 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-1209.htmlOverview: ERISA withdrawal liability dispute resolves when pension plan actuaries must select calculation assumptions, affecting billions in retirement obligations across multiemployer pension plans serving unionized workers nationwide.Question Presented: Whether ERISA requires actuarial assumptions underlying withdrawal liability calculations get selected on or before the statutory measurement date.Posture: D.C. Circuit affirmed district courts allowing post-measurement-date assumption selection, conflicting with Second Circuit precedent.Main Arguments:Employers (Petitioners): (1) Statute's "as of" language freezes all calculation inputs including assumptions on measurement date; (2) Actuarial assumptions constitute factual inputs requiring temporal fixation; (3) Broad anti-retroactivity principle prevents post-measurement assumption adoption.Pension Fund (Respondent): (1) "As of" language sets reference point for hard data only while tools get selected later; (2) Actuarial assumptions constitute analytical methods not observable facts; (3) "Best estimate" requirement supports using most current available data when selecting assumptions.Holding: The ERISA provisions governing the calculation of withdrawal liability from an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan do not require that actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation be selected on or before the statutory measurement date.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Affirmed D.C. Circuit.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) Section 1391's "as of" language assigns hard data to measurement date but permits calculation performance afterward using tools including assumptions; (2) Section 1393 imposes no deadline for assumption selection and Congress's omission from parallel provisions signals intentional choice; (3) "Best estimate" requirement necessitates access to most current data potentially unavailable before measurement date.Implications: Pension plans gain flexibility to select actuarial assumptions after measurement dates using current market data and professional judgment. Employers lose timing-based challenges but retain substantive reasonableness challenges through arbitration. Actuaries avoid artificial deadlines while maintaining accountability through reasonableness requirements. Court leaves open whether assumptions must reflect only information available as of measurement date.The Fine Print:29 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)(E)(i): Withdrawal liability calculated based on plan's unfunded vested benefits "as of" the last day of plan year preceding employer's withdrawal29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): Actuaries must use "actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"Primary Cases:Russello v. United States (1983): Where Congress includes particular language in one statutory section but omits it in another section of same Act, courts presume Congress acts intentionally and purposely in disparate inclusion or exclusionRomag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc. (2020): Courts generally decline reading limitations into statutes that do not appear in their textOral Advocates:For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. | Case No. 24-983 | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Decided: 5/21/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Supreme Court preserves Title III liability for entities trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuban Government even when plaintiff's underlying time-limited property interest expired before trafficking occurred.Question Presented: Whether cruise lines using Havana docks face liability when plaintiff's concession expired before their alleged trafficking.Posture: District Court granted summary judgment for Havana Docks; Eleventh Circuit reversed applying counterfactual analysis.Main Arguments:Havana Docks (Petitioner):(1) Statute's "owns the claim" language focuses on current claim ownership, not hypothetical property ownership in alternate timelines;(2) Cuba confiscated physical dock structures Havana Docks built, not just abstract concession rights;(3) Congressional purpose requires deterring companies from profiting off stolen property regardless of temporal limitations.Cruise Lines (Respondents):(1) Property law fundamentals require respecting original temporal limits on property rights;(2) Havana Docks' concession excluded passenger services and only covered cargo operations;(3) Congress deliberately balanced deterrence against property law principles without providing universal relief.Holding: Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines “trafficked” in Havana Dock’s property interest.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Sotomayor filed concurring opinion joined by Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Title III imposes liability for trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuba, not just trafficking in plaintiff's property interest;(2) "Using" confiscated property concerns physical things, not property interests—requiring one-to-one correspondence between interest confiscated and interest trafficked reads out obvious trafficking forms;(3) Cuba confiscated both Havana Docks' concession and physical dock structures by seizing control, making docks tainted property off-limits to users.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Kavanaugh): Flags infinite-recovery problem allowing unlimited repeated recoveries from unlimited defendants for single certified loss; raises due process concerns from government assurances cruises qualified as lawful travel.Justice Kagan (dissenting): Majority misconstrues statute to allow recovery for trafficking in property plaintiff never owned; Cuba confiscated only time-limited concession, not physical docks Cuba always owned; temporal property boundaries deserve equal respect to spatial boundaries.Implications: Companies doing business in Cuba using American-built infrastructure face substantial legal risk even when original American property interests expired decades ago. Decision preserves Title III as powerful deterrent preventing companies from waiting out clock on expired property interests. Lower courts must resolve whether statute allows unlimited repeated recoveries, whether lawful-travel exception shields defendants receiving government licenses, and whether concession limitations preclude passenger-service liability.The Fine Print:22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"22 U.S.C. § 6023(4)(A): "The term 'confiscated' refers to the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property"Primary Cases:Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964): Cuban Government nationalized by forced expropriation property in which American nationals held interests; confiscation can affect both physical property and property interestsTahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002): Property interests defined by both geographic dimensions and temporal aspects; both dimensions must be considered when viewing interest in entirety

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-83 | Decided May 14, 2026 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether federal courts retain jurisdiction to confirm or vacate arbitration awards when confirmation motions lack independent federal jurisdiction.Overview: Federal Arbitration Act case resolves circuit split over whether district courts maintaining stayed federal claims during arbitration keep jurisdiction to confirm or vacate resulting arbitral awards.Posture: District Court confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Fourth Circuit created split reading Badgerow broadly.Main Arguments:Jules (Petitioner):(1) Badgerow requires independent jurisdictional basis for all Section 9 and Section 10 motions regardless of pre-existing suits;(2) FAA created comprehensive jurisdictional scheme demanding textual authorization;(3) Service requirements in Sections 9 and 12 establish confirm-or-vacate applications as new federal actions.Balazs Properties (Respondent):(1) Pre-existing federal question jurisdiction over stayed claims extends to confirm-or-vacate motions within same case;(2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding applications without prior federal lawsuits;(3) Section 3 mandatory stay preserves jurisdiction for FAA's supervisory framework.Holding: A federal court that previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the FAA retains jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims.Voting Breakdown: 9-0 decision affirmed Second Circuit. Justice Sotomayor wrote unanimous opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. No separate opinions.Majority Reasoning:(1) Jurisdiction over cases includes jurisdiction over motions within those cases without requiring look-through approach to controversies outside court;(2) Federal question jurisdiction establishing district court authority over original federal claims survived arbitration stay and extended to confirm-or-vacate determinations;(3) FAA's supervisory framework requiring mandatory stays rather than dismissals contemplates courts superintending arbitration through final confirmation or vacatur.Separate Opinions: None.Implications: Federal courts maintain continuous jurisdiction over federal claims throughout arbitration and its aftermath. Streamlines arbitration by consolidating all proceedings—initial stay through final confirmation—in single federal forum when federal claims launched case. Prevents wasteful dual-track litigation where federal courts handle arbitrability appeals while state courts simultaneously handle confirm-or-vacate proceedings. Reinforces FAA's supervisory framework keeping courts engaged from arbitration commencement through final resolution.The Fine Print:Federal Arbitration Act § 3: "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement"28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"Primary Cases:Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Freestanding FAA confirm-or-vacate motions cannot use look-through approach to locate federal jurisdiction in underlying disputes not before court absent textual authorizationSmith v. Spizzirri (2024): Section 3 requires mandatory stays rather than dismissals when sending parties to arbitration, preserving supervisory role for courts assisting arbitration and facilitating award recoveryOral Advocates:Jules (Petitioner): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner and Block.Andre Balazs (Respondents): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone, LLP

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | Case No. 24-1238 | Decided May 14, 2026 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the FAAAA's safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against transportation brokers who arrange shipments with unsafe motor carriers.Overview: Truck crash victim challenges federal preemption of state tort claims against transportation brokers, testing whether states retain authority to impose negligent-hiring liability on brokers who select carriers with poor safety records.Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed district court preemption ruling; circuit split over broker liability.Interview with Marc Blubaugh: HereMain Arguments:Montgomery (Petitioner):(1) Negligent-hiring claims concern motor vehicles because they regulate which trucks transport goods on highways;(2) Safety exception preserves traditional state tort law policing dangerous conduct;(3) Brokers selecting unsafe carriers directly threaten highway safety and public welfare.C.H. Robinson (Respondent):(1) Brokers neither own trucks nor hire drivers, making claims unrelated to motor vehicles;(2) Safety exception limited to vehicle-specific regulations like inspections and maintenance standards;(3) Subsection (b) excludes brokers from safety regulation, making subsection (c) identical interpretation required.Holding: The FAAAA does not preempt negligent hiring claims made against transportation brokers because States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the FAAAA.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Alito. Reversed and remanded.Majority Reasoning: (1) Claims "with respect to motor vehicles" means claims that "concern" vehicles used in transportation, applying ordinary meaning and Dan's City Used Cars precedent; (2) Requiring brokers to exercise reasonable care when selecting carriers concerns the trucks transporting goods most obviously; (3) Safety exception saves only motor-vehicle-safety-related claims, leaving price and route regulations preempted, avoiding swallow-the-rule problem.Separate Opinions: Kavanaugh concurrence (joined by Alito): Case presents closer questions than majority suggests; contextual considerations point both directions; insurance coverage dichotomy and intrastate-interstate anomaly favor brokers; economic-deregulation structure and federal-regulation absence favor Montgomery; brokers retain defenses through reasonableness standard and proximate cause requirements.Implications: Transportation brokers face potential state tort liability when selecting motor carriers with poor safety records, affecting 28,000 brokers arranging one-third of domestic freight shipments. Courts must develop standards defining reasonable broker due diligence in carrier selection. Ruling creates enforcement asymmetry permitting state safety regulation for interstate but not intrastate broker arrangements, potentially inviting constitutional challenge to subsection (b) preemption authority.The Fine Print:49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1): "A State may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier or broker with respect to the transportation of property."49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(2)(A): The preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles."Primary Cases:Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey (2013): "With respect to" means "concerns" in FAAAA preemption provision context, establishing ordinary-meaning approach to statutory interpretation of preemption scope.Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp. (2012): State common-law duties and standards of care constitute "potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy" within state regulatory authority over safety matters.